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ABSTRACT 
The Department of Defense (DoD) National Security Personnel System 
(NSPS) was enacted through the FY 2004 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA), signed into public law by President George W. Bush on November 24, 
2003.  NSPS enactment served as a key pillar of DoD’s ongoing transformation 
effort and was an historically significant example of modern U.S. Civil Service 
reform.  It also serves as a valuable case study for other government agencies 
interested in enacting their own civil service reform in the future. 
The overall objective of this thesis is to construct an analytical history of 
the creation and enactment of the legislation that authorized NSPS.  The two 
primary research questions are: 1) how was the original NSPS legislative 
proposal, Section 101 of “The Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act,” 
created, and 2) how did Section 1101 of the FY 2004 NDAA, which authorized 
the establishment of NSPS, become law?  The thesis also explores how NSPS 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
We are engaged in a new and unprecedented war—the global war 
on terror.  But we are fighting that first war of the 21st Century with 
management and personnel systems that were developed decades 
ago, during or even before the Cold War.   
DoD is working to deal with the security threats of the 21st Century 
with a personnel system that was fashioned for the mid-20th 
Century.  We have an industrial age organization that is struggling 
to perform in an information age world.1  
  - Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
 
Reform of any type is never easy.  Enacting U.S. Civil Service reform has 
proven especially difficult in recent decades.  This was the substantial challenge 
faced by the Department of Defense (DoD) when it sought to reform how it 
managed civilian employees in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
Therefore, DoD’s successful enactment of NSPS, which substantially reformed 
its civil human resources management system, was an historically significant 
accomplishment.  It also serves as a valuable case study for future U.S. Civil 
Service reform efforts.   
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
(USD(P&R)) and the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Defense 
Management Reform funded this research project to record the history of 
enactment of NSPS through the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2004.   
                                            
1. Senate Committee, Transforming the DoD, 55, 56. 
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This thesis will briefly explain the main concepts of popular policy process 
frameworks, provide a brief history of U.S. Civil Service reform, and detail a 
variety of precedents for NSPS enactment.  It will provide a history of the creation 
of the original NSPS legislative proposal, followed by an account of its 
enactment, through the NDAA for FY 2004.  Next, it will explain how NSPS was 
created and enacted through the lens of three relevant policy process 
frameworks.  Finally, it will explore the implications of NSPS enactment and 
provide recommendations for future research.  
C. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
NSPS enactment is a topic of critical importance for two primary reasons.  
First, NSPS was an historically significant example of modern U.S. Civil Service 
reform and can serve as a case study for other government agencies interested 
in enacting their own civil service reform in the future.  Second, it served as a key 
pillar of DoD’s ongoing transformation effort.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The two research questions addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
1. How was the NSPS legislative proposal created?  More specifically, 
how was Section 101 of “The Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act” 
created?   
2. How was NSPS enacted?  More specifically, how did Section 1101 
of the NDAA for FY 2004, which authorized the establishment of NSPS, become 
law?   
E. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The thesis will detail the history of NSPS from creation through the signing 
of the public law that enacted it on November 24, 2003.  It will (1) briefly describe 
a number of popular policy process frameworks; (2) provide a brief history of U.S. 
Civil Service reform efforts, and detail precedents for NSPS authorization; (3) 
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examine how Section 101 of “The Defense Transformation for the 21st Century 
Act” was created; (4) describe the legislative process that led to the passage of 
Section 1101 of the NDAA for FY 2004; and (5) explain how NSPS was created 
and enacted through the lens of relevant policy process frameworks. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
In writing this thesis, we collected and analyzed information from three 
types of sources:  information provided by USD(P&R), publicly available 
documents, and interviews with key officials from institutions involved in NSPS 
creation and enactment.   
First, we reviewed documents provided to us by one of the thesis’ 
sponsors, USD(P&R).  These documents included talking papers, internal e-
mails, drafts of Congressional testimony, responses to Congressional inquiries, 
draft legislative proposals, comparisons of various legislative proposals, and 
briefing slides.  Our review of these documents provided us with an initial 
foundation of information to build upon. 
Next, we reviewed a wide array of publicly available documents.  This 
review included examining the relevant scholarly literature in public policy, 
legislative studies, management communication, and rhetorical theory.  It also 
included examining documentary evidence pertaining to the enactment of NSPS,  
including public media reports, statements and speeches by public officials, 
Congressional hearings and testimony, fact sheets and position papers from 
interested parties, Government Accountability Office reports, Federal Registers, 
Congressional Research Service reports, other theses, websites, reports from 
previous commissions and studies, and DoD strategic plans.  Using the 
additional information gleaned from these sources, we identified key players in 
the process, created a timeline of events, and drafted potential interview 
questions.   
 4
Finally, with the assistance of our thesis advisors, we conducted personal 
interviews with many of the key players in NSPS creation and enactment.  These 
individuals were members of DoD, Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 
American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB), and Congressional staffers.  The individuals we interviewed 
are denoted with an asterisk in Attachment 2.  These interviews greatly 
enhanced our understanding of the process and helped fill in the gaps that 
existed in the publicly available documents.   
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is organized as follows:  Chapter II briefly reviews popular 
policy theories and process frameworks, provides a brief history of U.S. Civil 
Service reform efforts, and details precedents for NSPS authorization.  Chapter 
III examines how Section 101 of “The Defense Transformation for the 21st 
Century Act” was created, including personal interview data that illustrate the 
positions and arguments of the institutions involved.  Chapter IV describes the 
chronological events that took the proposed legislation to final enactment via 
passage of Section 1101 of the NDAA for FY 2004, again using personal 
interview data to explain the process.  Chapter V concludes the thesis by drawing 




A. POLICY PROCESS FRAMEWORKS 
Understanding the policy process requires a knowledge of the 
goals and perceptions of hundreds of actors throughout the country 
involving possibly very technical scientific and legal issues over 
periods of a decade or more when most of those actors are actively 
seeking to propagate their specific ‘spin’ on events.2 
- Paul A. Sabatier 
 
The enactment of NSPS in November 2003 signaled a major shift in how 
DoD would manage its nearly 700,000-strong civilian workforce.  Considering 
how difficult it has been to achieve meaningful civil service reform in the past, it is 
prudent to examine a variety of theoretical frameworks regarding the policy 
process in order to gain a better understanding of how NSPS was enacted.  In 
Chapter V we explore how NSPS was enacted through the lens of the most 
relevant of these frameworks.      
In Theories of the Policy Process, Paul A. Sabatier outlined seven 
theoretical frameworks of the policy process:  Stages Heuristic, Institutional 
Rational Choice, Multiple-Streams, Punctuated-Equilibrium, Advocacy Coalition, 
Policy Diffusion, and Funnel of Causality.   
1. Stages Heuristic 
The Stages Heuristic framework, developed by Jones (1970), Anderson 
(1975), and Brewer and deLeon (1983), is the “textbook approach.”3  It broke the 
policy process down into a series of stages, usually depicted as agenda setting, 
policy formulation and legitimation, implementation, and evaluation.4  Sabatier 
                                            
2. Sabatier, Theories of Policy Process, 4. 
3. Ibid., 6.  
4. Ibid. 
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contended that this framework “served a useful purpose in the 1970s and early 
1980s by dividing the very complex policy process into discrete stages.”5  
However, he suggested that in the late 1980s and early 1990s the framework 
was widely criticized and thought to have “outlived its usefulness.”6 
2. Institutional Rational Choice 
The Institutional Rational Choice framework is actually “a family of 
frameworks focusing on how institutional rules alter the behavior of intendedly 
rational individuals motivated by material self-interest.”7  Much of the literature 
regarding this framework focuses on the relationships between specific 
institutions, such as the U.S. Congress and various executive branch agencies.8  
The framework is very broad and, according to Sabatier, “is clearly the most 
developed of all the frameworks … [and] arguably the most utilized in the United 
States.”9   
3. Multiple-Streams 
The Multiple-Streams framework, developed by Kingdon (1984), “views 
the policy process as composed of three streams of actors and processes:  a 
problem stream consisting of data about various problems and the proponents of 
various problem definitions, a policy stream involving the proponents of solutions 
to policy problems, and a politics stream consisting of elections and elected 
officials.”10  In Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Kingdon claimed these 
three streams normally operate independently of each other, but occasionally,  
 
                                            
5. Sabatier, Theories of Policy Process, 6. 
6. Ibid., 7. 
7. Ibid., 8. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid., 9. 
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“policy windows” open, providing “policy entrepreneurs” with brief opportunities to 
“couple” the various streams.11  If these entrepreneurs are successful, they can 
achieve a major policy change. 
4. Punctuated-Equilibrium 
The Punctuated-Equilibrium framework, originally developed by 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), advances that policymaking in the United States 
is “characterized by long periods of incremental change punctuated by brief 
periods of major policy change.”12  In Agendas and Instability in American 
Politics, Baumgartner and Jones claimed these periods of major policy change 
occur when opponents of the status quo create new “policy images.”13  They also 
argued the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework is driven by the interaction 
between two forces:  political agendas and instability, and how issues are 
portrayed and which institutions have jurisdiction over them.14   
5. Advocacy Coalition 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1988, 1993) Advocacy Coalition framework 
“focuses on the interaction of advocacy coalitions—each consisting of actors 
from a variety of institutions who share a set of policy beliefs—within a policy 
subsystem.”15  Within this framework, policy change is viewed as “a function of 
both competition within the subsystem and events outside the subsystem.”16 
                                            
11. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, 166, 172, 179. 
12. Sabatier, Theories of Policy Process, 9. 
13. Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and Instability, 25. 
14. Ibid., 1. 
15. Sabatier, Theories of Policy Process, 9. 
16. Ibid. 
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6. Policy Diffusion   
The Policy Diffusion framework, developed by Berry and Berry (1990, 
1992), suggests the adoption of a policy “is a function of both the characteristics 
of the specific political systems and a variety of diffusion processes.”17  
7. Funnel of Causality  
The Funnel of Causality and other frameworks in large scale, comparative 
studies are “a variety of frameworks that were extremely important in the United 
States in the 1960s and 1970s in explaining variation in policy outcomes across 
large numbers of states and localities.”18   
Examining these seven frameworks provided us with a basic 
understanding of the most popular policy process theories and gave us a 
foundation of knowledge to use as we began our review of the recent history of 
U.S. Civil Service reform.  
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 
In order to fully appreciate the significance of the enactment of NSPS, it is 
essential to have some understanding of the history of U.S. Civil Service reform.  
Two single pieces of legislation—the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 
and the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978—represent the most significant 
historical efforts to reform the system.  The former established the system itself, 
while the latter introduced the first major changes to it since its establishment.   
1. Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act 
Prior to 1883, most federal government employees were appointed or 
hired based on a system known as “patronage.”  After each election, victorious 
political candidates filled jobs with their supporters.  While some opposed the 
                                            
17. Sabatier, Theories of Policy Process, 10. 
18. Ibid. 
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system at the time, there was not enough public or political opposition to change 
it until the summer of 1881.  The event that brought the issue to national 
prominence was the shooting of President James A. Garfield on July 2, 1881, by 
a disgruntled office-seeker, Charles J. Guiteau.19 
On December 6, 1881, two and a half months after the death of President 
Garfield, Senator George H. Pendleton (D-OH) introduced the Pendleton Civil 
Service Reform Act.20  The primary goal of the act was to “regulate and improve 
the Civil Service of the United States,” and it provided for a Civil Service 
Commission, reaffirmation of veterans’ preference provisions, merit as a basis for 
hiring and promotion, and protection from arbitrary demotion or dismissal.21   
The Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 was signed into law by 
President Chester A. Arthur on January 16, 1883 and became the blueprint for 
the modern U.S. Civil Service system.22  It “created a Civil Service based on the 
merit principles of fair and open competition and competence in contrast to the 
corruption and incompetence that were rampant under the practice of 
patronage.”23 
2. Civil Service Reform Act 
The U.S. Civil Service system established by the Pendleton Civil Service 
Reform Act continued largely unchanged until the late 1970s.  President Jimmy 
Carter made civil service reform a “centerpiece” of his administration and 
established the Federal Personnel Management Project in 1977.24  Its charter 
was to develop a “comprehensive plan for civil service reform” and it was 
                                            
19. OPM, “Biography of an Ideal,” 199. 
20. Ibid., 201. 
21. Ibid., 206. 
22. Ibid., 205. 
23. OPM, HRM Policies and Practices, 3. 
24. OPM, “Biography of an Ideal,” 276. 
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comprised of nine task forces, each of which studied a specific topic.25  The final 
product of the project was a number of civil service reform legislative proposals.      
In March 1978, President Carter submitted the CSRA to Congress.26  The 
overall goal of the act was to “resolve both the procedural and organizational 
problems behind much of the criticism of the civil service.”27  The act included 
the following key elements:28 
 Abolition of the Civil Service Commission and creation of the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) and the Merit Systems Protection 
Board (MSPB) 
 A performance evaluation system 
 A merit pay system for mid-level managers 
 Creation of the Senior Executive Service (SES) 
 Greater protection for whistle blowers 
 Limitations on veterans’ preference 
 New authority for personnel administration research and development 
 A commitment to equal employment opportunity and a socially 
representative bureaucracy 
Additionally, the bill contained provisions authorizing the establishment of 
“demonstration projects” to try out new concepts.  OPM could establish up to ten 
demonstration projects at a time and the bill outlined procedures for departments 
and agencies to follow in setting up such projects.29 
                                            
25. OPM, “Biography of an Ideal,” 277-78. 
26. Ibid., 278. 
27. Ibid., 280. 
28. Pfiffner and Brook, Future of Merit, 2-3. 
29. OPM, “Biography of an Ideal,” 284. 
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As the bill worked its way through Congress, two significant changes 
occurred.  First, a provision to establish the Federal Labor Relations Authority 
(FLRA) was added, and second, the proposed limitations on veterans’ preference 
were removed.30 
The CSRA of 1978 was signed into law on October 13, 1978 and is 
codified in various sections of Title 5 of the U.S. Code.31 
As this very brief history illustrates, cases of U.S. Civil Service reform 
have been very rare.  This makes the enactment of NSPS an historically 
important event that warrants further study.     
C. PRECEDENTS FOR NSPS AUTHORIZATION 
Although the CSRA was the last major piece of legislation that resulted in 
widespread reform of the entire U.S. Civil Service, a variety of events have 
occurred since its passage that served as precedents for the enactment of 
NSPS.  Some were initiated by the government, while others originated outside 
the government.  Some were closely related and built upon each other, while 
others stood alone.  But each event was important and helped pave the way for 
NSPS enactment in some manner, be it large or small. 
Within the government, there were many precedent activities.  For 
example, DoD personnel demonstration projects and alternative personnel 
systems allowed the Department to test a variety of personnel management 
policies and procedures in order to assess those that were most effective.  The 
Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy report 
provided DoD with evidence that serious problems existed within the structure of 
its civilian workforce and how it was managed.  The U.S. Commission on 
National Security/21st Century Phase III report provided DoD further evidence of 
problems with how it managed its civilian workforce.  The DoD 2001 Quadrennial 
                                            
30. Pfiffner and Brook, Future of Merit, 2-3. 
31. OPM, “Biography of an Ideal,” 15. 
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Defense Review called for transformation of the Department, including how it 
recruited and managed its civilian workforce.  The President’s Management 
Agenda for FY 2002 listed strategic management of human capital as its first 
initiative and called on executive agencies to link pay with job performance.  The 
DoD Human Resources Strategic Plan directed the establishment of a “Best 
Practices” initiative and task force to identify the best civilian human resource 
management policies and procedures for possible Department-wide 
implementation.  The DoD “Best Practices” initiative and task force led to the 
development of the blueprint for the eventual NSPS.  The National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2003 Conference Report directed the Secretary 
of Defense to provide Congress with a list of legislative changes necessary to 
allow the Department to more effectively and efficiently manage its civilian 
workforce.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 contained significant and 
controversial civil service reform provisions for the 170,000 civilian employees of 
the newly-created Department of Homeland Security.  Many of these same 
provisions were eventually included in the NSPS legislative proposal submitted to 
Congress.  Finally, the National Commission on the Public Service report once 
again provided DoD with confirmation that there was a growing crisis within the 
U.S. Civil Service, including its own workforce, that required urgent attention. 
1. Personnel Demonstration Projects and Alternative Personnel 
Systems 
Title VI of the CSRA of 1978 authorized civil service demonstration 
projects and defined them as “a project conducted by the Office of Personnel 
Management, or under its supervision, to determine whether a specified change 
in personnel management policies or procedures would result in improved 
Federal personnel management.”32  Three of the most prominent of these  
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demonstration projects occurred at the Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, at 
DoD Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratories (STRLs), and in the DoD 
acquisitions workforce community.  
Section 6 of the Civil Service Miscellaneous Amendments Act of 1983 
authorized the China Lake Demonstration Project at the Naval Weapons Center, 
China Lake, California.33  Features of the project included a simplified 
classification system utilizing broad pay bands, a performance-based pay system 
for white collar employees, and increased flexibility for starting salaries.34  Only 
5,000 employees were authorized to participate in the project when it was 
originally implemented.35  After Congress extended authority for the project to 
continue in 1984 and 1988, it was extended indefinitely in 1994 by Section 342 of 
the NDAA for FY 1995.36  
Section 342 of the NDAA for FY 1995 also authorized the Secretary of 
Defense to conduct personnel demonstration projects at DoD laboratories 
designated as STRLs.37  Once fully implemented, eight STRL demonstration 
projects covered approximately 25,000 employees in twenty laboratories.38   
The STRL demonstration projects featured the following personnel 
provisions, some of which would later be included in NSPS:  pay banding, a 
simplified classification process, pay for performance (including contribution-
based pay), a simplified hiring process, modified reduction-in-force procedures, 
extended probationary periods, distinguished scholastic achievement 
                                            
33. DoD and OPM, Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 210, 66121. 
34. OPM, “Demonstration Project Factsheets.” 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. 
37. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Public Law 103-337, 103rd 
Cong., 2d sess. (October 5, 1994), 59. 
38. DoD, Assessment of Existing Civilian, 4. 
 14
appointments, modified term appointments, a voluntary emeritus corps, 
enhanced training and development, and sabbaticals.39 
According to the 2002 “Summative Evaluation” of these STRL 
demonstration projects by OPM’s Personnel Resources and Development 
Center, approximately 55 percent of employees participating in the projects 
favored them.40  When managers were asked what they liked best about the 
project, they indicated it was flexibility and the ability to reward strong  
performers.41  For employees, it was “their ability to advance faster than under 
the General Schedule (GS) system and to receive incentives for doing a good 
job.”42  DoD later used these evaluation results, and other similar ones, to argue 
its case for NSPS enactment.   
Section 4308 of the NDAA for FY 1996 authorized the Acquisition 
Workforce Demonstration Project (AcqDemo).43  Approximately 6,500 
employees were participating in AcqDemo in July 2003.44  AcqDemo 
implemented eleven personnel initiatives:  pay banding, contribution-based 
compensation and appraisal systems, simplified hiring procedures, a modified 
reduction-in-force process, expanded appointment authority, a simplified 
classification system, an expanded candidate selection process, academic 
degree and certificate training, a voluntary emeritus program, sabbaticals, and 
flexible probationary periods.45 
According to the AcqDemo 2001 “Attitude Survey of Participating 
Employees,” 35 percent of participants favored AcqDemo, and 47.3 percent 
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indicated they were satisfied with their pay.46  Following AcqDemo 
implementation, the minimum time to fill vacant positions was reduced from 123 
days to sixty-seven days, and position classification times were reduced by as 
much as 6.6 hours.47 
These demonstration projects set the stage for the DoD’s “Best Practices” 
initiative, which will be examined later in this section.  They allowed DoD to test a 
variety of personnel management policies and procedures over a number of 
years in order to assess those that were the most popular and effective.   
In addition to testing these policies and procedures, DoD also studied its 
overall human resources strategy.  This study was conducted by the Defense 
Science Board, whose charter is to provide the Secretary of Defense with 
“independent advice and recommendations on scientific, technical, 
manufacturing, acquisition process, and other matters of special interest to 
DoD.”48 
2. The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources     
Strategy 
The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy 
published its final report in February 2000.  The report warned there were serious 
concerns about the DoD civilian workforce:  “there is evidence that the quality 
and capability of the force is beginning to erode from the record highs of the mid-
1990s…and it is a concern that extends to the civilian workforce as well.”49  It 
noted the need for human resource management transformation:  “as the 
Department transforms its force structure to meet the needs of the 21st century, 
transforming the character and management of the human element of the force is 
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critical.”50  The task force also argued the situation needed immediate attention 
and that DoD needed to focus on “shaping an effective civilian force for the future 
and developing effective tools to support this effort.”51   
The report highlighted a number of problems in the DoD’s civilian 
workforce:  an aging population, an insufficient number of new workers being 
hired, a lack of professional development opportunities, and inflexible 
compensation and incentive systems.52  More specifically, it noted a number of 
alarming statistics about DoD civilian personnel, which accounted for about 40 
percent of all federal government civil servants.  For example, the number of 
DoD civilian employees was cut from about 1.15 million in 1989 to approximately 
730,000 at the end of FY 1999, an overall reduction of 36 percent.53  The median 
age of this workforce had risen from forty-one in 1989, to forty-six in 1999, and 
the median length of service had risen from eleven to seventeen years.54  
Additionally, DoD planned a further reduction of 80,000 civilian employees by the 
end of FY 2005, which would constitute a total downsizing from 1989 through 
2005 of 41 percent, compared to an active duty military reduction of about 36 
percent.55  In other words, the number of DoD civilian workers had been 
drastically reduced and those who remained were getting older and closer to 
retirement age. 
Another challenge with the current system noted in the report was the fact 
that military personnel issues received more attention than civilian personnel 
issues.  One of the primary reasons cited for this was jurisdictional in nature.  
The report pointed out “the Secretary of Defense and the defense committees in 
Congress have authority over military personnel while the Office of Personnel 
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Management oversees the civilian workforce.”56  Such an arrangement, it 
suggested, “makes it difficult to execute timely changes in civilian force-shaping 
tools.”57 
The report warned the DoD’s current human resource policies and 
practices would not meet the needs of the 21st century force, and that 
”developing effective force-shaping tools, to meet the demands of the future, will 
require continuing change in personnel policies and programs.”58   
The task force specifically identified two factors that it claimed limited the 
effectiveness of the civilian workforce:  “a one-size-fits-all core personnel 
management system with rules set by OPM,” and “limited tools for recruiting, 
sizing, and shaping the civilian force.”59 
It also commented on the fact that demonstration projects were being 
utilized to overcome problems with the current system rather than to create and 
implement improvements to it: 
…there is evidence that the demonstrations have become a vehicle 
to “work around” the current system, rather than change it as new 
mechanisms are proven effective.   
It is time for the Department to infuse greater discipline into the 
demonstration process—to start extending successful reforms 
across DoD and converting them into personnel policies and 
programs.60 
Based on its work, the task force made the following recommendations: 
 The DoD should establish a strategic human resources plan 
encompassing all elements of the total force:  military, civilian, and 
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private sector personnel.61  The plan should include changes in 
legislation and directives and create new management tools to meet 
specified goals.62 
 The DoD should develop force-shaping tools that are appropriate for 
the 21st century. The task force identified a number of priority areas for 
both civilian and military personnel.  For civilian personnel, it 
recommended DoD “propose legislation amending, as necessary, 
appropriate provisions of the United States Code (Title 10 and Title 5) 
to transfer authority for the Department’s civilian workforce from the 
Office of Personnel Management to the Secretary of Defense. This 
transfer would permit the Secretary to establish policies and develop 
force-shaping tools for all components of the new ‘total force’ and in 
doing so, meet changing DoD requirements.”63 
The Defense Science Board Task Force was not the only group that 
studied the DoD’s civilian human resources strategy.  This issue was also 
indirectly examined by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 
shortly after the task force completed its work.    
3. U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, commonly 
known as the “Hart-Rudman Commission,” was initiated “out of a conviction that 
the entire range of U.S. national security policies and processes required 
examination” following the end of the Cold War.64  It was established “to redefine 
national security…in a more comprehensive fashion than any similar effort since 
1947.”65   
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The commission completed its work during three distinct phases.  Phase I 
was conducted from July 1998 to August 1999, and the Phase I report, New 
World Coming:  American Security in the 21st Century, was published in 
September 1999.66  This report attempted to predict how the world would likely 
evolve over the next twenty-five years.  Phase II was conducted from August 
1999 to April 2000, and the Phase II report, Seeking a National Strategy: A 
Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom, was published in April 
2000.67  This report proposed a U.S. national security strategy to deal with the 
world in 2025.  Phase III was conducted from April 2000 to February 2001, and 
the Phase III report, Road Map for National Security:  Imperative for Change, 
was published in February 2001.68  This final report served as “a blueprint for 
reorganizing the U.S. national security structure” and recommended a substantial 
“redesign of the structures and processes of the U.S. national security system” in 
order to meet the challenges of 2025.69 
As a relatively small part of the commission’s work, it examined issues 
related to the human resources aspect of national security and management of 
the U.S. Civil Service.  Section IV of the Phase III report was entitled “The 
Human Requirements for National Security” and specifically addressed the U.S. 
Civil Service.  It noted that even though there was some disagreement about the 
extent of the crisis in the U.S. Civil Service, there were a number of serious 
problems that required immediate attention.  These problems included an aging 
federal workforce and challenges associated with recruiting and retaining new 
government employees, especially those with information technology skills and 
less-common language skills.70  The report also pointed out that “many of these 
problems are self-inflicted to the extent that departmental authority already 
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provides some remedy if only the institutional will and budgetary resources were 
also available.”71  It specifically noted that while a number of incentive programs 
existed to recruit and retain employees, sufficient funds were seldom available to 
pay for them:   
OPM and individual agency personnel offices have designed many 
incentive programs to recruit and retain quality employees, but 
many departments and agencies have not used these programs 
due to lack of funds. Because all incentive programs are drawn 
from the same pool of money as that for salaries, administrators 
must trade off incentives for some employees against the ability to 
hire additional personnel.  Additional funds must be provided to 
maximize agencies’ options in recruiting and retaining high-quality 
personnel.72 
The report also highlighted the fact that the civil service was facing a 
rapidly aging workforce, 60 percent of whom were eligible for early or regular 
retirement at the time it was published.73  This troubling figure was even more 
serious, the report claimed, due to the small number of government employees in 
their twenties and thirties.74  These concerns were quite similar to those raised 
by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy report.  
The commission made this recommendation:  “the President should order 
the elimination of recruitment hurdles for the Civil Service, ensure a faster and 
easier hiring process, and see to it that strengthened professional education and 
retention programs are worthy of full funding by Congress.”75 
On March 29, 2001, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger 
and Admiral Harry D. Train (USN, Retired), both of whom served as 
commissioners, testified before a Joint Hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of 
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Columbia, and the House Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency 
Organization.  They stated “it is the Commission’s view that fixing personnel 
problems is a precondition for fixing virtually everything else that needs repair in 
the institutional edifice of U.S. national security policy.”76  Additionally, they noted 
“Although the Commission’s mandate involved a review of the entire U.S. 
national security apparatus, the fourteen Commissioners believe the issue of 
human capital to be so important that it comprises one of only five major sections 
in the report.”77 
This commission’s report provided DoD with another assessment that 
indicated there were serious problems with the current U.S. Civil Service system 
and by extension, its workforce, this time by a respected, non-partisan, non-DoD 
commission.  It would serve as another study to reference when arguing the 
urgent need for NSPS enactment.    
In late 2001, DoD also highlighted the need for change in how it managed 
its civilian workforce when it published the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.  
4. DoD 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report was published on 
September 30, 2001 and it mapped out “the most comprehensive reform of HR 
programs, systems, and practices in DoD’s history.”78   
According to the DoD Assessment of Existing Civilian Personnel 
Demonstration Authorities, the “starting point” for the DoD’s strategic planning 
efforts was the 2001 QDR report, which set the stage for the “transformation of 
America’s defense for the 21st century.”79  In response to the QDR, DoD  
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“developed the 2002-2008 Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan to ensure 
this transformation with a talented and professionally developed civilian 
workforce.”80 
The QDR asserted that a transformed U.S. military force must be matched 
by a support structure that was equally “agile, flexible, and innovative,” and that 
highly skilled and motivated people were the “foundation of a leaner, more 
flexible support structure.”81  Therefore, the QDR classified improving the skills of 
the existing workforce and recruiting and retaining new individuals as top 
priorities.82  It noted that accomplishing these objectives would require strong 
leadership and innovative thinking, and new rules for hiring and managing 
personnel.83  To help accomplish these objectives, the report stated the DoD 
would develop a strategic human resources plan for both military and civilian 
personnel which would “identify the tools necessary to size and shape the 
military and civilian force to provide adequate numbers of high-quality, skilled, 
and professionally developed people.”84 
 The QDR indicated many of the “advances” in private sector human 
resources management had not been incorporated into the DoD civilian 
personnel management system.  It therefore recommended the adoption of a 
human resources approach that included:  modernized recruiting techniques, a  
more flexible compensation system, enhanced training, and additional career 
planning and management tools.85 
 
 
                                            
80. DoD, Assessment of Existing Civilian, ii. 
81. DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review, 49-50. 
82. Ibid., 50. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Ibid. 
85. Ibid., 51. 
 23
In simplest terms, the 2001 QDR called for “transformation” of the DoD, 
and this initiative was one of the primary justifications cited when NSPS was 
being debated.  In fact, NSPS was eventually referred to as the “centerpiece” of 
the transformation of the DoD.86      
5.   President’s Management Agenda for FY 2002 
The call for reform of the U.S. Civil Service was also included in President 
George W. Bush’s management agenda for FY 2002.  The first government-wide 
initiative listed in the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) was “Strategic 
Management of Human Capital.”87  In introducing the topic, President Bush 
provided the following assessment: 
We must have a Government that thinks differently, so we need to 
recruit talented and imaginative people to public service.  We can 
do this by reforming the civil service with a few simple measures.  
We’ll establish a meaningful system to measure performance.  
Create rewards for employees who surpass expectations.  Tie pay 
increases to results.  With a system of rewards and accountability, 
we can promote a culture of achievement throughout the Federal 
Government.88 
The agenda document made a claim similar to the one included in the 
QDR:  “the managerial revolution that has transformed the culture of almost 
every other large institution in American life seems to have bypassed the federal 
workforce.”89   It also pointed out there was a lack of accountability in the current 
civil service system.  As a result, “excellence goes unrewarded, mediocre 
performance carries few consequences, and it takes months to remove even the 
poorest performers.”90  To illustrate the extent of the problem, it also pointed out 
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the Government Accountability Office (GAO) added human capital management 
to the government-wide “high-risk list” of federal activities in February 2001.91  
Additionally, the PMA indicated the administration would seek a limited 
number or “targeted civil service reforms,” but encouraged agencies to better 
utilize the human resource management authorities and flexibilities currently in 
place.92  The administration would also assess how these existing authorities 
and flexibilities were being used by agencies, as well as the effectiveness of a 
variety of demonstration projects.  This assessment would then be used to 
determine what “statutory changes” were needed to “enhance management 
flexibility, permit more performance-oriented compensation, correct skills 
imbalances, and provide other tools to recruit, retain, and reward a high-quality 
workforce.”93 
The Bush Administration clearly made “strategic management of human 
capital” one of its top priorities, and NSPS supported this goal.  Specifically, the 
pay-for-performance provision of NSPS was in line with the PMA because it 
would link pay increases with job performance.      
6. DoD Human Resources Strategic Plan 
The Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) 
published the first integrated, DoD-wide Civilian Human Resources Strategic 
Plan in April 2002.  The Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan, 2002-2008 
was developed in conjunction with senior human resources officials from each of 
the military departments and a number of Defense agencies, and detailed the 
DoD’s future direction, including its “vision, values, principles, critical success 
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goals, and objectives.”94  It was also “designed to determine the tools, policies, 
programs, and compensation strategies needed for the future.”95 
The plan was “built from the QDR and direction provided by USD(P&R)” 
and served as the DoD human resources roadmap for establishing and 
monitoring planned activities.96  During the creation of the plan, existing strategic 
plans for the Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and 
Washington Headquarters Services were consulted, as was the OPM vision for 
the Federal government’s human resources strategic focus.97  The plan also 
addressed the issues raised in the Human Capital Initiative of the PMA.98 
One of the arguments made by NSPS supporters was the need for DoD to 
recruit more effectively in order to replace the large number of civil servants who 
would be retiring in the near future.  This issue was also addressed in the 
strategic plan, and the first of its seven goals was to “promote focused, well-
funded recruiting to hire the best talent available.”99   The first objective under 
this goal was to “develop a recruitment strategy designed to attract candidates at 
any level,” and sub-objectives included “determine source of change required in 
legislation and departmental regulations and practices,” and “develop legislative 
and/or regulatory changes.”100   
The second goal was to “provide a human resources system that ensures 
the readiness of tomorrow’s integrated force structure.”101  The first objective 
under this goal was to “benchmark human resources processes and practices 
against industry best practices,” and a sub-objective was to “analyze current DoD 
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practices and processes to identify best practices.”102  This sub-objective led to 
the eventual establishment of the Best Practices Task Force.  A second objective 
was to “continue to pursue legislative and regulatory change to provide for 
flexible workforce lifecycle management,” and a sub-objective was to “draft 
proposed legislative and regulatory language as appropriate.”103  This led to the 
eventual creation of The Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act, the 
legislative proposal DoD submitted to Congress seeking the enactment of NSPS.  
The third objective was to “evaluate and transform civilian personnel policies to 
create flexible business-like processes,” and one sub-objective was to “evaluate 
demonstration projects” and “identify desirable aspects” of them.104   
After the publication of the original civilian human resources strategic plan 
in April 2002, the following subsequent annexes were published:  Annex A, FY 
2002 Annual Report; Annex B, FY 2003 Year of Execution Plan; Annex C, FY 
2003 Annual Report; and Annex D, FY 2004 Year of Execution Plan. 
One of the most significant aspects of the strategic plan was that it 
directed the establishment of a “Best Practices” initiative, which would analyze 
current DoD practices and processes in order to identify those most beneficial for 
possible DoD-wide implementation.  This was a key step that eventually led to 
most of the substance of the NSPS legislative proposal and the push for its 
enactment.  NSPS, DoD would argue, was a system developed to implement 
civilian human resource management best practices from within DoD and from 
private industry. 
7. DoD “Best Practices” Initiative and Task Force 
In March 2002, USD(P&R) directed the establishment of the DoD Human 
Resources Best Practices Task Force.105  The task force consisted of 
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representatives from each of the military departments, the Washington 
Headquarters Service, DLA, and the acquisition and laboratory communities.106  
Officials from both the STRL and AcqDemo demonstration projects participated 
in the task force.107  Its charter was to “compile the most promising human 
resources practices in the government, both within and outside the Department, 
that would form the basis for a new human resources management system 
suited to DoD’s national security challenges.”108  In doing so, it reviewed 
demonstration projects and alternative personnel systems throughout the 
government in an effort to compile proven best practices that showed promise for 
possible expanded adoption across the DoD.109  The task force reviewed a total 
of nine demonstration projects and two alternative personnel demonstration 
projects.110  It had four working groups:  Classification and Pay, Staffing, 
Benefits and Entitlements, and Performance Management.111  It evaluated each 
initiative using the following four criteria:  whether the initiative was in accordance 
with merit system principles and avoided prohibited personnel practices, whether 
it was workable, whether it was acceptable, and whether it was affordable.112 
The Best Practices Task Force examined three aspects of civilian human 
resource management:  compensation, recruitment, and performance 
management, and the task force provided innovative recommendations in the 
following areas:  1) pay banding, 2) classification, 3) hiring and appointment, 4) 
pay-for-performance, 5) sabbatical authority, 6) volunteer service, and 7)  
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reduction in force procedures.113  The ultimate result of the task force’s work was 
a “consensus on practices that should be adopted for a single DoD human 
resources system.”114 
The Best Practices Task Force presented its in-process review briefing to 
USD(P&R) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) in May 2002, and its final briefing to them in July 2002.115  
In turn, USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L) tasked the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy (DUSD(CPP)) “to review the proposals with 
senior executives from the Components as well as Acquisition and Laboratory 
communities.”116  The task force’s products were “reviewed, revised, and 
approved during the first week of December 2002 by senior human resources 
and functional executives.”117  The final product of the task force’s work was the 
publication of a Federal Register Notice on April 2, 2003.  This notice “proposed 
the revision (by amendment) of existing personnel demonstration projects to 
comply with best practices as identified by the Human Resources Best Practices 
Task Force and revised and approved by senior leadership.”118  This meant all 
current demonstration projects and alternative personnel systems would be 
replaced by a new system, comprised of the best practices identified by the task 
force.  All these best practices fell under one of the following categories:  pay 
banding, classification, hiring and appointment authorities, pay administration, a 
pay-for-performance evaluation system, expanded sabbatical authority, a 
volunteer emeritus program, and revised reduction-in-force (RIF) procedures.119  
                                            
113. DoD, Assessment of Existing Civilian, 8.  
114. Ibid., 6. 
115. OSD, Federal Register, Vol. 68, No. 63, 16120. 
116. DoD, Civilian H.R. Strategic Plan, Annex A, 8. 
117. DoD, Civilian H.R. Strategic Plan, Annex C, 3. 
118. Ibid.   
119. DoD, Federal Register, Vol. 68, No. 63, 16120.  
 29
In DoD’s view, the Best Practices Initiative was a “landmark effort” that 
moved DoD “beyond a piecemeal approach to a new, unified system of human 
resources management based on retention of merit system principles, 
accommodation of veterans’ preference, respect for collective bargaining, and 
sustainment of the enduring values of civil service.”120  
According to Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
David S.C. Chu, the Best Practices Initiative was DoD’s effort to “boil down the 
best human resources management concepts and practices from those in and 
outside of the Department,” and was a plan “to expand tested personnel 
flexibilities throughout the Department.”121  He also called it a “detailed blueprint 
for a new system of hiring, assigning, rewarding, and replacing employees” that 
could be applied “to about 150,000 of Defense civilians who are covered by 
demonstration project and alternative personnel system authority.”122  However, 
he additionally indicated new legislation would be needed to further expand the 
new system “for the balance of the workforce and in order to provide additional 
critical flexibilities, particularly in the area of labor bargaining.”123 
When asked directly if the final product of the task force’s work served as 
the “blueprint” for NSPS, Ginger Groeber, a task force member and the Former 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy, confirmed it 
did.124  
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8.   National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2003 Conference 
Report 
The NDAA for FY 2003 Conference Report, published on November 12, 
2002, indicated conferees were aware that the federal government was facing a 
potential “human capital crisis” and it could severely impact DoD.125  The report 
acknowledged DoD had developed a human resources strategic plan and had 
aggressively implemented a number of civilian personnel demonstration projects, 
but conferees feared “these steps alone may not be sufficient to meet the 
demand for new hires and to accommodate the reshaping necessary to 
transform the Department.”126  Therefore, the report directed the Secretary of 
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to review the Department’s human resources 
strategic plan and all existing civilian personnel demonstration authorities.127  
Rumsfeld was also tasked to provide the House and Senate Armed Services 
Committees, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, and House Government 
Reform Committee “an assessment of the effectiveness of these authorities and 
recommend any legislative changes necessary to effectively and efficiently 
manage the civilian employees of the Department of Defense” no later than 
March 31, 2003.128  In other words, the conference committee directed him to 
provide it with the necessary legislative proposals to change DoD’s current 
civilian human resources management system.   
On August 18, 2003, nearly five months past the deadline set by the 
conference report, DoD provided each of the aforementioned committees with 
the Department of Defense Assessment of the Existing Civilian Personnel 
Demonstration Authorities report.129  This report contained the following 
information:   
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 A discussion of the personnel demonstration projects, including 
demographic information, intervention/initiatives, and preliminary 
findings. 
 A discussion of DoD’s review of the most promising practices tested in 
the personnel demonstration projects and other alternative personnel 
systems. 
 An explanation of a corporate strategy for embedding these best 
practices into DoD personnel demonstration projects. 
 Identification of recommendations to facilitate the management of an 
effective DoD civilian workforce.130  
The conference report was significant because it illustrated the fact that 
Congress was aware of problems within the DoD civilian workforce and was 
interested in passing legislation to help fix them.  It most likely signaled to DoD 
that a legislative environment existed in which NSPS would have a good chance 
of being enacted. 
9. Homeland Security Act 
President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 into law 
on November 25, 2002.131  This act established the Department of Homeland 
Security as a Cabinet-level federal agency by combining twenty-two existing 
government agencies into one department.  This was an historic event and has 
been referred to as “the largest reorganization of the federal government since 
the creation of DoD in 1947.”132    
The bill contained controversial civil service reform provisions that 
completely reconstructed the management practices and pay systems for the 
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approximately 170,000 civil service employees who transferred into the new 
department.133  As passed, the bill authorized the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in coordination with OPM, to “establish, and from time to time adjust, a 
human resources management system for some or all of the organizational units 
of the Department.”134  The system was to be “flexible, contemporary, and 
grounded in the public employment principles of merit and fitness.”135 
In terms of civil service reform, the significance of the act was that it gave 
the head of a Cabinet-level federal agency the authority to establish a human 
resources system, outside of the established U.S. Civil Service system.  This 
provision became one of the most controversial and heavily debated aspects of 
the entire act. 
Individuals who were involved in the effort to enact NSPS differ over the 
significance of the HSA.  Some, such as former OPM Deputy Director Dan 
Blair,136 believe NSPS would never have been proposed without the HSA, while 
others, such as former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, Charlie Abell,137 believe DoD would have proposed 
NSPS even if the HSA had never been enacted. 
10. The National Commission on the Public Service Report 
The second National Commission on the Public Service (the first 
commission was convened in 1988), commonly known as the “Volcker II 
Commission,” was convened by the Brookings Institution’s Center for Public 
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Service in 2002.138  Its chairman was Paul A. Volcker, former Federal Reserve 
Board Chairman under Presidents Carter and Reagan.139  It was “born of the 
realization that what the first Volcker Commission termed ‘the quiet crisis’ in the 
public service had become a roar.”140  The members of the bipartisan 
commission “joined in a common conviction” that the time had come “to bring 
government into the 21st century.”141   
The commission issued its final report in January 2003 and it called for 
“sweeping changes in organizational structure and personnel incentives and 
practices.”142  In its “Case for Change” chapter, the report listed a number of 
reasons the civil service system was in urgent need of substantial reform, a 
partial explanation of why this reform had not occurred thus far, and some of the 
ramifications of the system’s shortcomings.   
Some of the reasons identified for why the system needed to be reformed 
were “one-size-fits-all management, vanishing talent, personnel systems that 
were out of touch with market reality, personnel systems that were immune to 
performance, and labor-management conflict.”143  One of the primary problems 
highlighted about the system was that it did not reward strong job performance.  
According to the commission, “The bedrock principle of the government’s 
employee classification system was — and is — that job description and time in 
service determine one’s compensation, not skill nor training nor education nor 
performance.”144  This was acceptable when the system was created and most 
government employees were clerks performing nearly identical work.  But as the 
report noted, the federal government was no longer dominated by people 
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performing low-skilled jobs.  That made the concept of “equal work” nearly 
impossible to apply to the majority of the tasks performed by civil servants in 
various government agencies.145  The report concluded: “the consequence is a 
compensation system that makes few distinctions between hard-working high-
achievers and indifferent nonachievers,” and “there are too few rewards for those 
who do their jobs well and too few penalties for those who perform poorly.”146 
The report attempted to explain why desperately needed reforms had not 
been enacted: 
Few leaders in Washington, even those who understood the 
importance of revitalizing the public service, were willing to expend 
the political capital deemed necessary to do so.  And government 
reorganization has come to be viewed as a task so daunting, 
requiring such extensive and excruciating political negotiations, that 
it takes a national emergency to bring it about.147 
The report pointed out there were serious ramifications that resulted from 
the current system’s shortcomings:  “Those who enter the civil service often find 
themselves trapped in a maze of rules and regulations that thwart their personal 
development and stifle their creativity. The best are underpaid; the worst, 
overpaid. Too many of the most talented leave the public service too early; too 
many of the least talented stay too long.”148   
Also, the report claimed that it was widely recognized there were big 
problems with the current organization and management of the U.S. Civil Service 
and “…the vast majority of federal employees know the system is not working 
and is in need of repair.”149 
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The commission made fourteen specific recommendations, four of which 
we list here that were directly related to the issue of civil service reform: 
 Recommendation 2:  The operating agencies in these executive 
departments (described in Recommendation 1) should be run by 
managers chosen for their operational skills and given the authority to 
develop management and personnel systems appropriate to their 
missions.150 
 Recommendation 11:  More flexible personnel management systems 
should be developed by operating agencies to meet their special 
needs.151 
 Recommendation 12:  Congress and the Office of Personnel Management 
should continue their efforts to simplify and accelerate the recruitment of 
federal employees.152 
 Recommendation 13:  Congress should establish policies that permit 
agencies to set compensation related to current market comparisons.153 
The report concluded that “the federal workforce must be reshaped, and 
the systems that support it must be rooted in new personnel management 
principles that ensure much higher levels of government performance.”154  The 
need for change, it stressed, “could not be more urgent.”155 
The significance of the report for NSPS was that it provided DoD with 
confirmation from a highly respected, non-partisan, non-government commission 
that there was truly a “crisis” in the U.S. Civil Service.  It supported general NSPS 
initiatives such as increased flexibility in managing civil servants and specific 
                                            
150. National Commission, Urgent Business for America, 16. 
151. Ibid., 27. 
152. Ibid. 
153. Ibid., 30. 
154. Ibid., 26.  
155. Ibid., 34. 
 36
initiatives such as pay-for-performance.  More importantly, it suggested executive 
departments be given the “authority to develop management and personnel 
systems appropriate to their missions,” which is what DoD was seeking through 
NSPS.  
Chu referenced the recommendations of the Volcker II Commission during 
Congressional testimony in April 2003, stating “the rigidities of the current federal 
personnel management system are well documented by … the National 
Commission on the Public Service (popularly known as the Volcker II 
Commission) in its January 2003 report, Urgent Business for America:  
Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century.”156 
OPM Director Kay Coles James also mentioned the report in her 
Congressional testimony in May 2003, stating, “the call for reform is becoming an 
ever-louder chorus as managers and leaders join us and others, including the 
Volcker Commission, in stating the need for reform and suggesting where best to 
start.”157 
As illustrated here, a variety of events occurred following the passage of 
the CSRA in 1978 that served as precedents for the enactment of NSPS.  Each 
helped paved the way for its enactment in some manner. 
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III. CREATION OF SECTION 101 OF “THE DEFENSE 
TRANSFORMATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY ACT” 
A. SECRETARY RUMSFELD’S TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE 
One of Rumsfeld’s key priorities as Secretary of Defense was to transform 
the U.S. military by shifting it from a force designed to fight the Cold War, to a 
force designed to fight smaller, regional conflicts against non-traditional enemies.  
In simplest terms, he wanted to transform the military into a force capable of 
fighting the wars of the 21st century.  This agenda was reflected in the 
September 2001 QDR, which mentioned the word “transformation” eighty-nine 
times and stated “Transformation is not a goal for tomorrow, but an endeavor that 
must be embraced in earnest today.”158  In a speech at the National Defense 
University on January 31, 2002, he also stressed transformation included the 
department’s civilian workforce:   
We must transform not only our armed forces, but also the 
Department that serves them by encouraging a culture of creativity 
and intelligent risk taking.  We must promote a more 
entrepreneurial approach to developing military capabilities, one 
that encourages people, all people, to be proactive and not 
reactive, to behave somewhat less like bureaucrats and more like 
venture capitalists.159 
Rumsfeld had challenged DoD leaders to think about transformation in 
broad terms since he was sworn in as Secretary of Defense on January 20, 
2001, but in November 2002, he tasked them to provide him with specific 
statutory, regulatory, and policy changes that would be required in order to 
initiate true transformation of the department. 160  According to Ginger Groeber, 
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who was the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy at 
the time, Rumsfeld was asking what DoD needed to do to improve the 
department, create a more modern structure, and have it operate more 
efficiently.161  In response, her office provided ideas it hoped would modernize 
the system, assist supervisors, and allow them to more easily recruit and 
manage DoD civilian employees.  In Groeber’s terms, they started with 
something they thought “would fly politically, which was pay banding,” and 
ultimately moved to “a different compensation system that would move away 
from the general schedule system.”162  After reviewing the transformation 
proposal her office had submitted, Rumsfeld was apparently shocked that it was 
so minimal and reportedly responded, “Is that all there is?  Are you kidding me?  
Is this all you guys want to change?”163  Chu indicated Rumsfeld told him at the 
time to “go for everything you can.”164  Groeber was surprised by Rumsfeld’s 
response and indicated that if he was truly serious about transforming the 
system, her office would like to “overhaul the entire civil service process,” as they 
had been trying to do for a number of years.165  According to Chu, Rumsfeld’s 
request for transformation initiatives coincided with the completion of his office’s 
Best Practices Initiative and Task Force, and Chu saw it as an opportunity to 
“consider extending these [Best Practices] authorities to the entire  
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department.”166  In Chu’s view, Rumsfeld’s response provided a green light to be 
more ambitious in trying to overhaul DoD’s entire civilian human resources 
management system: 
We started out to simply use the authorities we already had, wisely.  
An opportunity arose to think about doing something more 
ambitious.  The planets came together…so it was the right moment 
in history to bring this forward.167 
Former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, Charlie Abell, echoed this sentiment.  When Rumsfeld challenged the 
department to provide plans for its transformation, “David and I threw this [NSPS] 
in the hopper and it became quickly the thing that they said among all the things 
that were proposed … ‘this might be doable.’”168   
Considering the scope of what they had to put together, Chu, Abell, and 
Groeber did not have much time to prepare it: Chu recalled they only had 
approximately three weeks to draft the original legislative proposal for NSPS.169  
B. CREATION OF THE ORIGINAL NSPS LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 
Abell and Groeber worked with Helen Sullivan, who at the time served as 
DoD’s Senior Associate Deputy General Counsel for Labor Relations, to draft the 
original NSPS legislative proposal.  Sullivan helped them translate ideas into 
words and provided legal advice.  She also worked closely with attorneys at the 
White House, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and in Congress 
throughout the enactment process.     
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Abell had a very clear idea about what he thought the original proposal 
should look like.  He wanted it to be very broad in scope and concise in length.  
He suggested to Chu: 
Let’s propose an authority that says, in two lines, ‘the Secretary of 
Defense shall develop a civilian personnel policy for the national 
security arena,’ period, amen.  Let’s not go over with a bureaucratic 
laid-out skeleton with flesh on it.  Let’s go as broad as we can 
because, in the process, everybody around us will add things to 
this, and so we ought to give them the barest bones to which they 
could add things, and we’ll end up with a more structured system 
than we would hope for.170   
Abell favored this approach because he knew a number of provisions 
would be added when OMB and OPM reviewed the proposal and after various 
Congressional committees debated it.   
Chu and Abell also planned to exempt DoD from the rigid requirements of 
Title 5 of the U.S. Code by adding their proposed legislation to Title 10 instead.  
The U.S. Code details the general and permanent laws of the U.S., and Title 5 
codifies laws pertaining to “Government Organization and Employees,” while 
Title 10 codifies laws pertaining to the “Armed Forces.”171 
As a result of Abell’s desire for the proposal to be broad and concise, and 
Chu and Abell’s desire to insert the new system into Title 10, the original NSPS 
legislative proposal was loosely worded as follows:  “Notwithstanding all other 
titles, the Secretary of Defense may create his own human resources 
management system.”172  They wrote this first draft, as a proposed addition to 
Title 10, without input from either OPM or OMB.  
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Abell compared this original NSPS legislative proposal to the “Eisenhower 
Directive” for D-Day:  “invade Europe, destroy the enemy.”173  His intent was to 
start with just one or two sentences and “only add those things we have to add to 
it.”174   
It is unclear precisely where the name “National Security Personnel 
System” came from.  Sullivan indicated the original name for the proposed 
system was the “Defense Personnel System,” but she said that “Defense” was 
replaced with “National Security” to make it “seem more global.”175  She thought, 
but could not confirm, that Rumsfeld or Chu initiated this name change.176   
C. DOD/OPM IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES EMERGE 
Once completed, the original draft proposal was submitted directly to 
OMB, without OPM coordination.  According to Robert Shea, who at the time was 
the Counselor to the Deputy Director for Management at OMB, DoD sought an 
“expedited clearance process” and therefore asked OMB “to do an initial 
clearance so that any inter-agency clearance could be expedited or 
circumvented.”177  In his opinion, “DoD was clearly trying to circumvent OPM in 
the clearance process, so OPM had to be much more aggressive to assert 
themselves.”178   
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This was the first indication that there was some degree of friction 
between DoD and OPM at the time.  This friction grew as the NSPS legislative 
proposal moved forward towards enactment. 
Abell characterized DoD’s relationship with OPM at the time as “formal,” 
and indicated that OPM was quite concerned that DoD was involving itself in civil 
service reform, particularly because OPM considered itself, in Abell’s terms, the 
“guardians of the civil service, and thus civil servants.”179  He also indicated 
OPM Director Kay Coles James was “difficult to deal with” for three reasons.180  
First, she saw herself as a peer to Chu rather than Abell, and Abell indicated that 
she was therefore hesitant to converse directly with him instead of Chu.  Second, 
he believed she was concerned that DoD was going to go in a direction that did 
not reflect the Bush Administration’s overall personnel management agenda.  
And third, he sensed that she was troubled by his numerous strong personal 
contacts on Capitol Hill, contacts that allowed him to work directly with various 
members of Congress and their committees.    
Groeber was even more candid in her description of DoD’s relationship 
with OPM, suggesting it was quite adversarial in nature.  She asserted that “the 
only people internal to the government that we had fighting us was the Office of 
Personnel Management,”181 and that “they were constantly trying to put us in our 
place.”182  Groeber also said that individuals at OPM had openly indicated to her 
that OPM would not support any major civil service reform proposals DoD put 
forward.  This lack of support was in stark contrast to the relationship the two 
agencies had enjoyed during the past two presidential administrations, Groeber 
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lamented, during which DoD and OPM worked collaboratively to achieve 
numerous changes to the civil service system.183  In Groeber’s recollection, 
James informed DoD that not only would OPM would henceforth initiate all 
reform initiatives, but also that James discontinued joint meetings that were 
designed to address various human resources management issues.184 
Groeber believed the main point of contention between DoD and OPM 
was a difference in philosophy.  In broad terms, DoD believed that with the right 
accountability structure in place, you could design a human resources 
management system that gave managers the authority to manage their people 
without constantly having to seek permission to take various actions.  As Groeber 
put it, “You don’t have to spend all that bureaucratic time having people come in 
and ask for permission.”185  Conversely, Groeber explained, OPM preferred not 
to grant power to agencies, but instead require them to constantly seek OPM 
approval before acting.  In short, Groeber believed that OPM wanted extensive 
oversight over personnel matters:   “[OPM felt that] central oversight of the 
government required that they [OPM] monitor any system that any agency set 
up, and [OPM should] be involved in it to make sure that it was consistent across 
the government in fairness to the American people.”186   
DoD’s response to OPM’s position was that the current system was not 
working and needed to be drastically changed.  Furthermore, Groeber argued 
that the system had eroded and could hardly be seen as a unified system in its 
current state: “oversight of agencies across the board had been so fractioned by 
many agencies having different authority that you can’t think of it as one 
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government structure anymore; there are multiple agencies that have multiple 
authorities and have multiple missions that are different.”187   
Groeber also argued that OPM was opposed to DoD’s desire to enact 
NSPS because OPM wanted to ensure its own survival as an agency.  She 
pointed out that approximately half of all federal civilian employees were 
employed by DoD.  If OPM were to lose oversight over all of these employees, 
Groeber explained, OPM’s role would diminish significantly.  Groeber 
characterized OPM’s resistance as a “survival tactic,”188 and lamented that 
“instead of looking at how you further human resources [management]…it was 
more territorial, [as in] ‘I have to keep what I have.’”189 
Sullivan also indicated the DoD and OPM relationship was “not 
cordial.”190  Her view was that “OPM was another outside agency with whom we 
had to deal to get a law.”191  She believed there was a general sentiment within 
DoD that the OPM Director could not, and should not, try to tell the Secretary of 
Defense how to run his department or fight the global war on terrorism.  In her 
mind, DoD had to work around OPM, not with it; there was a general DoD 
attitude, Sullivan said, to just “give us [DoD] what we want and go away.”192 
From the OPM perspective, one of the biggest issues was the manner in 
which DoD introduced the NSPS legislative proposal to them.  According to Doris 
Hauser, who was the Senior Policy Advisor to the Director, OPM at the time, Chu 
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and others went to the OPM Director’s office sometime in February 2003 to brief 
James on their legislative proposal for NSPS.193  Hauser recollected that the 
purpose of the visit was “pretty much to tell [James about the proposal] and invite 
support, and point out that national security was at stake.”194  Hauser claimed 
that Chu and his associates were not shy about “imposing the national security 
necessity,” and that every other sentence contained the words “national 
security.”195  DoD stressed that unless it was given independent authority, 
national security would be at stake and, further, that OPM “dare not oppose” 
NSPS.  Hauser left the meeting with the impression that DoD felt it “just writes its 
own legislation and you are supposed to salute.”196  She also acknowledged that 
there was a “huge amount” of tension between DoD and OPM at the time and 
some of it was “personality driven.”197 
Despite DoD’s apparent lack of interest in collaborating with OPM, Hauser 
and others believed OPM could help DoD achieve many of its goals, most of 
which could be realized through the utilization of pre-existing Title 5 flexibilities.  
Her interest was also in helping DoD write legislation that would be less 
controversial and therefore get enacted more easily.  However, OPM asserted 
that their overriding concern was maintaining the integrity of the merit system 
principles across the Federal government.  Dan Blair, OPM Deputy Director at 
the time, noted that James fought very hard to ensure OPM had a “seat at the 
table” during the process, “not because of the organization itself, but keeping in 
mind its interest in ensuring a merit-based system.”198  Blair also asserted that “if 
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push would have come to shove, I don’t think that they [DoD] would have sought 
our assistance so much as we insisted on our participation.”199  OPM officials 
also believed that giving DoD authorities other government agencies did not have 
would give DoD an unfair advantage.  Hauser summed up OPM’s viewpoint this 
way:  “We have to take a point of view that is not only right for one agency, but 
what implications it has for the other [agencies].  It is not just what is right for you.  
It is what is going to be sensible and not cause unintended consequences.”200  
Ron Sanders, former Associate Director for Policy at OPM, echoed this 
sentiment.  He noted that OPM was concerned that with NSPS, DoD would have 
an advantage over other government agencies in a number of ways, specifically 
in recruiting new employees.  For example, he believed DoD would have an 
unfair advantage over NASA when they both tried to hire scientists because DoD 
would be able to hire more quickly and offer a higher starting salary under 
NSPS.201    
While he fully supported OPM’s quest to maintain the integrity of the merit 
system principles, Sanders also admitted that OPM had a reputation of being 
somewhat hard to deal with, stating that “flexibility is antithetical to OPM.”202  He 
also agreed with Groeber’s assertion that OPM was indeed concerned about its 
institutional survival should DoD gain the authority to create its own civilian 
human resources management system.     
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D. REVISION OF THE ORIGINAL NSPS LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 
At OMB, DoD encountered a different kind of opposition; specifically, OMB 
objected that the original, concise version of the NSPS legislative proposal was 
not acceptable.  According to Sullivan, shortly after the original proposal was 
submitted, she was summoned to OMB and told to redraft the proposal to make it 
fall under Title 5 of U.S. Code, and to model the human resources management 
system provisions after those included in Section 9701 of the recently enacted 
Homeland Security Act of 2002.203  She was reportedly told to make those 
changes or “tell us why you need a difference.”204  OMB officials explained to her 
that the Bush Administration had already “done battle” and “shed blood” to get 
the DHS human resources management system enacted, and they were not 
prepared to do either again for DoD.205  They advised her that the “sum of your 
universe” is what was enacted for DHS.206  Based on this OMB guidance, 
Sullivan did a cut and paste of Section 9701 from the HSA of 2002 and then 
made the necessary changes to include different or additional authorities 
requested by DoD.  For example, she added verbiage that provided the 
Secretary of Defense with a “national security waiver” to the requirement that he 
jointly prescribe all NSPS regulations in conjunction with the Director, OPM.207 
Over at OPM, officials were generally very supportive of OMB’s directive 
that DoD make its NSPS legislative proposal resemble the corresponding HSA of 
2002 provisions.  Hauser noted, “It is an instrumental approach for civil service 
                                            
203. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 107th Cong., 2d sess. (November 
25, 2002), 2230. 
204. Helen Sullivan (Senior Associate Deputy General Counsel for Labor Relations, 
Department of Defense), in interview with Dr. Douglas A. Brook, Dr. Cynthia L. King, Maj Shane 





reform to follow the same path.”208  She also expressed her strong belief that if 
the legislative proposal did not require DoD to collaborate with OPM in 
developing NSPS, the legislation would be opposed by numerous members of 
Congress:   
We knew from the DHS saga that there were key Congressional 
leaders who would say, ‘is OPM going to be providing adult 
supervision?’  We knew there was that kind of trust [in] OPM to do 
the right thing for the whole system.209   
 While officials at OPM were pleased by OMB’s guidance, officials at DoD 
were not.  Many believed there were fundamental differences between DHS and 
DoD, and therefore DoD’s human resources management systems needed to be 
different.  For example, DHS only operated within the boundaries of the U.S., 
while DoD operated around the globe.  DHS was tasked with protecting the U.S. 
against attack, while DoD was tasked with fighting and winning the nation’s wars.   
 Abell bristled and took exception when the NSPS legislative proposal was 
compared to the newly-enacted DHS system.  He believed DHS and DoD were 
moving in a similar direction, but on parallel, rather than identical, tracks.  Abell 
said that DoD knew exactly what it wanted from NSPS, and it was not the same 
as the system DHS had gained authority to develop.  Instead, DoD wanted a 
system that was performance-based, empowered supervisors and employees, 
allowed for a great deal of flexibility, and was less bureaucratic.210  When 
Senator Susan M. Collins (R-ME) first asked him why DoD did not simply adopt 
the DHS system, Abell reflected this position:  
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They [DHS] took the first step, thank you.  We’re going to take the 
second step.  And, then, hopefully somebody later will take the third 
step.  But we don’t want to settle for this [DHS]; we can do 
better…the guys after us can do better yet.  We’ll all learn from 
them.211 
Groeber shared Abell’s sentiment.  In her mind, OMB’s decision to model 
NSPS after the system designed for DHS was the “worst thing” the administration 
decided.212  She felt this decision severely hampered DoD’s ability to develop 
and implement NSPS. 
As the NSPS legislative proposal was being revised, a number of points of 
contention arose between DoD and OPM.  In broad terms, they differed in their 
views of the importance of achieving government-wide civil service reform versus 
reform of just the DoD civilian human resources management system.  As part of 
his prepared statement to a House Armed Services Committee (HASC) hearing, 
Chu explained why DoD could not afford to wait for the initiation of government-
wide civil service reform.  He bluntly told the committee, “our national security 
responsibilities do not allow us to wait for others to act.”213  Blair believed DoD 
approached civil service reform “from a singular viewpoint of what would 
enhance its mission,” but he argued “that’s why there is a central personnel 
office…to approach government as a whole rather than as a disparate part.”214  
Hauser echoed this sentiment, noting OPM had to “take a point of view that is not 
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only right for one agency, but what implications it has for the other.”215  Nancy 
Dorn, former Deputy Director, OMB, observed that DoD “really wanted their 
proposal and they didn’t really care that much about what happened to the rest of 
the government.”216  Alternatively, OPM was arguing that if you had DoD to 
“hitch your wagon to,” you might be able to achieve government-wide reform, but 
“if you let DoD and DHS ‘out of the corral’ and set up specific things for them, 
then you were unlikely to get any sort of broader government reform.”217  Former 
White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card expressed a number of observations 
about the rift between the two organizations.  In his view, OPM was “not very 
tolerant to what was happening at DoD from a bureaucratic point of view, and 
DoD wasn’t really looking to play with OPM.”218  He believed there was a 
“bureaucratic stand off,” and both organizations were “doing their own thing and 
hoping that the other side would go away.”219 
In terms of specific details of the legislative proposal, Sanders indicated 
there were eight to nine “major issues” that DoD and OPM could not agree 
upon.220  Three of the more noteworthy issues were the national security waiver, 
veterans’ preference in hiring, and the creation of a separate Senior Executive 
Service (SES) for DoD.  As previously mentioned, within the legislative proposal, 
DoD included a national security waiver that would allow the Secretary of 
Defense to waive the requirement that he jointly prescribe all NSPS regulations 
in conjunction with the Director, OPM.  In addition, the proposal waived the 
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requirement for DoD to apply veterans’ preference when hiring, and instead 
required that DoD merely consider prior military service during the hiring process.  
The proposal also granted DoD the authority to create and manage its own, 
distinct SES.  Each of these three proposed authorities was strongly opposed by 
OPM. 
E. OMB ACTS AS A MEDIATOR FOR DOD AND OPM 
With DoD and OPM unable to reach any agreement on these major 
issues, OMB stepped in to resolve their differences.  Nearly everyone 
interviewed for this study agreed that OMB served as a “referee” between the 
two agencies during this contentious period of the process.  Clay Johnson III, 
Deputy Director for Management, OMB, played a leading role in bringing the two 
sides together, according to Blair.221     
 One key meeting that led to the resolution of the key points of contention 
between DoD and OPM was chaired by Card and occurred at the White House.  
According to Hauser, the Secretary of Defense and the OPM Director were 
directed to attend the meeting and bring one key staff member with them.222  
James selected Hauser to attend the meeting, and they were both surprised 
when Rumsfeld showed up accompanied by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Under 
Secretary Chu, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. 
Myers, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Powell A. 
Moore.223  According to Chu, Myers volunteered to attend the meeting because 
he believed the issue was so important to the overall success of the U.S. 
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military.224  It is unclear why the remaining individuals accompanied Rumsfeld to 
the meeting, but Card indicated that it was to demonstrate the importance of the 
issue to DoD and to ensure that its position was well represented and supported.  
In Card’s terms, this move was a “show of the big foot participation,” as 
Rumsfeld’s attempt to “put an exclamation point on the need” for NSPS, “to 
motivate me to pay attention,” and to stress “this is important…we have to get 
this done.”225  But Card also felt that “in the eyes of OPM,” it put an “exclamation 
point on [DoD’s] arrogance.”226   
 During the meeting, each agency presented its position and tried to gain 
Card’s support, and there were periods when the atmosphere was, in Hauser’s 
terms, “a little tense.”227  According to Hauser, Rumsfeld repeatedly stressed 
how important NSPS enactment was to ensuring national security, and James 
often responded by claiming “there is no OPM Director now, or ever, who is 
going to try to disrupt that.”228   
After hearing both sides present their case, Hauser said that Card ended 
the meeting by saying that he “heard the issues,” and he would let them know his 
decisions soon.229 Shortly thereafter, he presented his decisions to DoD and 
OPM.  The results were that DoD maintained its provision for a national security 
waiver, but it could not waive veterans’ preference or create its own SES.  
Consequently, OPM believed Card’s decisions “by and large went the OPM 
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way.”230 For their part, DoD felt that the decisions altered the “cornerstones” of 
NSPS.231  The NSPS legislative proposal was amended to reflect the unified 
administration position on these issues but, as Shea pointed out, “there were still 
violent disagreements as to what the unified administration position should 
be.”232  Both OPM and DoD felt as though they had lost portions of the debate, 
and Shea felt that both agencies recognized that “there would be many 
opportunities to re-litigate those debates” during the enactment process on 
Capitol Hill.233 
F.   DOD/AFGE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES 
In January 2003, after resolving most of its differences with OPM, DoD 
met with American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) officials for the 
first time to discuss the NSPS legislative proposal.  One of DoD’s goals was to 
communicate to AFGE their desire to make DoD’s civilian human resources 
management system “attractive enough” so managers would “continue to use 
DoD civilians versus contracting out the work.”234  Groeber viewed it as a “huge 
opportunity” for AFGE to partner with DoD to transform the system, but, in her 
estimation, an opportunity that AFGE ultimately did not take.235   
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According to DoD, there was not much to discuss with union officials 
because DoD felt that AFGE (the largest union affected) strongly favored the 
status quo. From DoD’s perspective, AFGE opposed making any changes to the 
current DoD civilian human resources management system because they felt the 
current system was fine.  Sullivan summed up DoD’s perspective this way: “there 
was no dialogue about a common approach because there was no common 
approach.”236  Groeber said it was “very tough” to talk to union officials, and she 
also indicated that AFGE’s position was that they did not need to change, and 
further that all DoD was trying to do was contract out government civilian jobs.237  
She felt AFGE officials simply could not move beyond what she called the “old 
struggle of management against labor unions.”238  When face-to-face 
conversations did take place, they were very contentious and did not even yield 
an “intelligent conversation,” according to Groeber.239  Groeber also expressed 
regret over the fact that union officials could not take off their “militant hat” and 
understand that what DoD was really trying to do was save civil service jobs.240 
Sanders expressed his belief that there was “no real effort” on the part of 
DoD to work with AFGE for three reasons.241  First, there was still a lot of 
bitterness between the Bush Administration and unions due to the fight over 
human resources management provisions that were enacted in the HSA of 2002.  
Second, administration officials had learned during their struggle with unions over 
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the HSA of 2002 that “collaboration didn’t pay dividends.”242  Finally, DoD and 
administration officials did not think there was much AFGE could do to prevent 
the enactment of NSPS because Republicans held the majority in both houses of 
Congress at the time.  Therefore, courting their support was not essential to its 
enactment.  
AFGE officials expressed their own deep frustrations about trying to 
discuss the proposed NSPS legislation with DoD.  Among other things, they 
argued that DoD failed to provide specific details about the system and why it 
was needed, that they had no real interest in collaborating with unions, and that 
they had a right-wing, anti-union agenda.    
According to AFGE Chief of Staff Brian DeWyngaert, trying to get detailed 
information from DoD was always a problem because “they would never give [us] 
anything specific.”243  He said he consistently asked what specific problems DoD 
was trying to address, but all he got was what he termed “rhetoric,” such as “we 
need the flexibility to win all future wars.”244 
DeWyngaert also believed that despite DoD assurances to the contrary, 
they had no real interest in collaborating with AFGE.  During their initial meeting, 
DeWyngaert offered to work with DoD to create a “bold” new system, and then to 
go to Capitol Hill together to lobby for its enactment.245  He argued that if they 
could collaborate, such jointly developed legislation would pass swiftly and then 
could be quickly implemented.  Among the issues he proposed they address 
together were labor-management relations, employee recognition and 
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compensation, adverse actions, and the appeals process.246  However, 
DeWyngaert quickly realized that DoD was not really interested in working with 
AFGE on reform issues: “their disdain for working with the unions as legitimate 
partners overrode any interest in getting true reform.”247  Mark Roth, AFGE 
General Counsel, suspected the only reason DoD officials met with AFGE 
officials was to “cover themselves” for subsequent Congressional questions as to 
whether or not DoD had met with unions while developing its NSPS legislative 
proposal.248  When such questions arose, DoD officials could then say, 
according to Roth, “absolutely, we’ve met with the unions, we’ve consulted with 
them, and we’ve heard their views.”249 
Additionally, DeWyngaert asserted that DoD had a right-wing, anti-union 
agenda.  To support this claim, he pointed to a January 10, 2001, Heritage 
Foundation article, Taking Charge of Federal Personnel, written by George 
Nesterczuk, Donald Devine, and Robert Moffit.250  The article encouraged 
President Bush to “install as many political appointees as necessary to advance 
his agenda, restore merit and accountability to the civil service, and reward high 
performers.”251  Additionally, it argued the President should attempt to build 
broad public support for comprehensive civil service reform, allow the public 
sector to handle certain key government functions, and reform compensation 
packages for federal employees.252  DeWyngaert and Roth therefore believed 
the true motivation behind the NSPS legislative proposal was to further this right-
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wing agenda.  They suspected members of the Bush Administration intended to 
weaken employee unions, replace union workers with private contractors, and 
radically reform the current civil service system.  If successful, they claimed these 
initiatives would result in an erosion of the rights and benefits of remaining union 
workers.  They also pointed out the fact that Nesterczuk later became a Senior 
Advisor to the Director, OPM, and the NSPS Overarching Integrated Product 
Team (OIPT) Co-Chair during NSPS implementation. 
Finally, DeWyngaert found the timing of the NSPS legislative proposal 
“ironic,” since it was at about the same time Operation Iraqi Freedom began.253  
He pointed out that during the debate over the HSA of 2002, the justification the 
Bush Administration used for it was the “flexibility to fight terrorism,” and when 
NSPS started being discussed, the justification used for it was also the “flexibility 
to fight terrorism and fight different wars in the future.”254  In other words, they 
suggested the Bush Administration used the “global war on terrorism” as its 
primary tool to garner support for both the HSA of 2002 and NSPS.  
G.   SUBMISSION OF THE NSPS LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO 
CONGRESS 
After resolving its major differences with OPM, and making an effort to 
meet and confer with AFGE officials, DoD was ready to finalize and submit their 
NSPS legislative proposal to Congress.  They did so on April 10, 2003, when the 
General Counsel of the Department of Defense, William J. Hayes III, sent a 
memorandum of proposed legislation from DoD to the Speaker of the House and 
the President of the Senate.255  This memorandum, entitled “The Defense 
Transformation for the 21st Century Act,” was a proposal for legislation designed 
to “promote the national security” by providing a National Security Personnel 
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System, a streamlined acquisition system, realistic appropriations and 
authorization laws, and the coordination of the activities of DoD with other 
departments and agencies concerned with national security.256  Section 101 of 
the proposed act contained the provisions for NSPS.257  Now fully created and 
coordinated within the Executive branch, the NSPS legislative proposal could 
move forward towards enactment in the Legislative branch.   
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IV. PASSAGE OF SECTION 1101 OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2004 
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 
The passage of Section 1101 of the NDAA for FY 2004 was a strategic 
process that included partisan politics, precise timing, and calculated rhetoric.   
A. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE LEGISLATION 
Prior to the submission of The Defense Transformation for the 21st 
Century Act in April 2003, there had been a brief, half-hearted attempt by the 
DoD to introduce similar civil service reform legislation.  In August 2001, Charlie 
Abell—former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, and former Professional Staff Member for the Senate Armed 
Services Committee (SASC) during the Clinton Administration—approached 
Senator Susan M. Collins (R-ME) and informed her of DoD’s intent to propose 
such legislation for FY 2003.  As a staff member for the SASC, Abell witnessed 
previous attempts at DoD civil service reform that did not leave the Executive 
branch.258  Drawing from these experiences, he approached the NSPS 
legislation with ideas for getting it through: “When I came to the Department, [I 
had] a list of things I thought maybe we could work [on]...We had an advantage 
that I had been around the system a long time, so [I] learned how not to get to a 
door and find it closed.”259   
This first reform attempt began in late 2002 when Rumsfeld wanted to 
attach an NSPS-like bill as an amendment to the NDAA for FY 2003.  Senator 
Daniel K. Akaka (D-HI), who was a member of the SASC at the time, opposed 
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the amendment and led the effort to remove it.260  “There were several attempts 
at arm twisting,” recalled Nancy Langley, former Deputy Staff Director to Senator 
Akaka, but Senator Akaka rejected the amendment because he “didn’t think that 
this was something that should go forward without real discussion.”261  
Groeber also recalled this earlier attempt, which she characterized as 
“very weak” and submitted at the “very last minute.”262  The DoD did not make a 
concerted effort to push this amendment, but Groeber believed it was a 
significant precursor to the push in 2003: “it was from this [earlier effort] that we 
built our playbook for the next year…it was the marker on the table.”263   
In early February 2003, Rumsfeld and Chu started seeking support for the 
fully developed NSPS legislative proposal.  They knew it was essential to gain 
allies in Congress to ensure enactment of NSPS.  More specifically, they needed 
support from key members of the four Congressional committees that held 
primary jurisdiction for civil service reform in the DoD:  the SASC, the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee, the HASC, and the House Government Reform 
Committee. 
The difference between late 2002 and early 2003 was the transition of 
Congressional control from the Democrats to the Republicans.  During the 108th 
Congress, the Republicans held the majority in the House of Representatives, 
with 227 Republicans, 210 Democrats, and one Democrat-aligned 
Independent.264  Republicans also held the majority in the Senate, with 51 
Republicans, 48 Democrats, and one Democrat-aligned Independent.265 
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B. COMMITTEE RESPONSIBILITIES 
To better understand the role that each of the committees played in the 
passage of the legislation, it is important to understand their primary 
responsibilities. 
1. Senate Armed Services Committee 
The SASC has responsibilities primarily associated with “the common 
defense; the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the 
Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, generally.”266  The 
SASC also authorizes programs affiliated with the DoD in the annual defense 
authorization bill.  Senator John W. Warner (R-VA) served as the Chairman of 
this committee during the 108th Congress, and Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) served 
as the ranking minority member. 
2. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 
The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee has the responsibility of 
handling all proposed legislation regarding the federal civil service, including   
“evaluating the effects of law enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive 
branches of the Government.”267  During the 108th Congress, Senator Susan M. 
Collins (R-ME) was the Chairman of this committee, and Senator Joseph I. 
Lieberman (D-CT) served as the ranking minority member. 
3. House Armed Services Committee 
The HASC has jurisdiction over “laws, programs, and agencies in 
numerous titles of the United States,” to include Title 10, which pertains to the 
armed forces.268  The responsibilities of this committee cover all of the DoD and 
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“common defense generally.”269  The committee also “carries out its oversight of 
the DoD and its subordinate departments…through activities involving the full 
committee and its standing subcommittees.”270  During the 108th Congress, 
Representative Duncan L. Hunter (R-CA) was the Chairman of this committee, 
and the ranking minority member was Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO).271 
4. House Government Reform Committee 
The House Government Reform Committee is the “main investigative 
committee in the U.S. House of Representatives.”272  The committee’s 
responsibilities cover a multitude of jurisdictions within the government, to include 
the federal civil service.273  As it relates to the federal civil service, the committee 
has jurisdiction over “the status of officers and employees of the United States, 
including their compensation, classification, and retirement.”274  During the 108th 
Congress, Representative Tom Davis (R-VA) was the Chairman of this 
committee, and Representative Henry A. Waxman (D-CA) was the ranking 
minority member.275 
C. DOD EFFORTS TO GAIN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR NSPS 
Chu considered his role as the “chief proponent, in terms of testimony,” on 
Capitol Hill, and he lobbied for support of NSPS by testifying before numerous 
committees on multiple occasions.276  The first two committees Chu lobbied were 
the HASC and the House Government Reform Committee.  In early February 
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2003, Chu attended a meeting with Representatives Hunter and Davis, during 
which he briefed them on the main components of NSPS and why the DoD 
urgently needed authorization to develop and implement it.  According to Chu, 
both committee chairmen were quite supportive:  “Midway though my 
presentation to Davis, Representative Hunter said ‘David, you can stop.  He’s 
already convinced.’”277  Chu remarked that “this was very much like knocking on 
the door that was already ajar.”278   
Rumsfeld met with and testified before many of the same committees as 
Chu.  On February 5, 2003, Rumsfeld testified before the HASC while it was 
debating the NDAA for FY 2004.279  In his testimony, he noted that Congress 
had recently enacted historic legislation to create a new Department of 
Homeland Security, which included civil service reform provisions that provided 
DHS with the authority to implement a number of civilian human resources 
management system flexibilities.  Rumsfeld asked the committee members for 
their support in his quest to similarly transform the DoD:  
I feel we should now address the Department of Defense.  We are 
already working with a number of you and with your staffs to help 
fashion legislation that we can present to you later this year to try to 
bring the Defense Department into the 21st century and to 
transform how it moves money, manages people and buys 
weapons.280 
This transformation included giving the DoD greater flexibility in how it 
managed its civilian workforce.281  His testimony was significant because it 
                                            
276. Dr. David S. C. Chu (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness), in 
interview with Dr. Douglas A. Brook, Dr. Cynthia L. King, Maj Shane Prater, and CPT Eric 
Timmerman, Washington, D.C., September 19, 2007. 
277. Ibid. 
278. Ibid. 
279. House Committee, National Defense Authorization Act, 4. 
280. Ibid., 7. 
281. Ibid. 
 64
served as a notice to the committee that the DoD was creating a legislative 
proposal to change its civilian human resources management system. 
Although Rumsfeld and Chu were the most highly visible DoD officials 
advocating for NSPS, many informal meetings were taking place behind the 
scenes to help gain momentum, including meetings with the members of the 
HASC and SASC.  According to Abell, “Tom Davis organized several meetings 
with his committee members and us that were not hearings.”282  Abell noted that 
these meetings made the committee members “more comfortable” in light of the 
reports coming in from unions and other NSPS opponents: 
They were being told by constituents and rumor mills and unions 
what this thing did. [It] was very helpful to us to be able to go over 
there in an informal setting, not recorded and not in the public eye, 
and tell them and their staffs, ‘no, no that’s not true.’  We would 
take every question.283 
D. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON CIVIL SERVICE 
REFORM 
1. March 11, 2003 – SASC Subcommittee on Personnel 
On March 11, the SASC Subcommittee on Personnel held a hearing to 
discuss the DoD’s civil service reform plan.  During the hearing, Chu explained 
why transforming the DoD’s civilian human resources management system was 
necessary:  
We are working to promote a culture in the Defense Department 
that rewards unconventional thinking—a climate where people have 
freedom and flexibility to takes risks and try new things…so they 
can move money, shift people, and design and buy weapons 
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quickly, and respond to sudden changes in our security 
environment.  Today, we do not have that kind of agility.284 
2. March 13, 2003 – HASC Total Force Subcommittee 
Following the SASC subcommittee hearing, the HASC Total Force 
Subcommittee held DoD transformation hearings two days later on March 13.  
Testifying again on behalf of DoD was Chu, who reiterated Rumsfeld’s earlier 
statement that the DoD would be “seeking legislative authority to create a 
national security personnel system.”285  Agility and flexibility were cited as the 
main reasons this reform was needed.  Chu provided examples to illustrate the 
challenges DoD confronted daily with the existing system, specifically in terms of 
its attempts to shape the civilian workforce of the future.  Pointing to the 
successes of the China Lake demonstration project, he stated that “we would like 
to emulate what China Lake has done in its much heralded demonstration over 
the last couple of decades,” which he suggested would help in this transformation 
effort.286   
E. INTRODUCTION OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS THAT LED TO NSPS 
ENACTMENT 
1. H.R. 1588 – The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 
2004 
On April 4, H.R. 1588, the NDAA for FY 2004 was introduced by Chairman 
Hunter and referred to the HASC for committee hearings and debate.287  As 
introduced, the NDAA for FY 2004 did not contain any NSPS provisions because 
the DoD NSPS legislative proposal had not been submitted to Congress yet.288  
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Despite this, H.R. 1588 eventually became the vehicle for NSPS enactment, but 
not until after the development of H.R. 1836, the Civil Service and National 
Security Personnel Improvement Act.  Hearings for H.R. 1588 were scheduled 
for May 1 and 2.  While the House discussed its proposed legislation, the Senate 
was as busy creating its own. 
2. S. 927 – The Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act 
  On April 28, 2003, Chairman Warner introduced S. 927, the Defense 
Transformation for the 21st Century Act, co-sponsored by Levin.289  The bill was 
read twice and referred to the SASC.  No further action was taken by the SASC 
on S. 927.290  Senator Levin later joined Senator Collins in introducing S. 1166, 
the National Security Personnel Act, which also contained provisions that called 
for the establishment of NSPS.291 
3. H.R. 1836 – The Civil Service and National Security Personnel 
Improvement Act 
On April 29, 2003, Chairman Davis introduced H.R. 1836, the Civil Service 
and National Security Personnel Improvement Act.292  The precursor and 
foundation for H.R. 1836 was DoD’s The Defense Transformation for the 21st 
Century Act, which was sent to the Speaker of the House and the President of 
the Senate on April 10.293  The overall purpose of DoD’s proposed legislation 
was “to promote the national security,” and it included provisions to transform 
how DoD managed its personnel, acquisitions process, installation management, 
and administration.294  The goal of H.R. 1836 was to improve the flexibility and 
competitiveness of DoD civilian human resources management by making 
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changes in selected federal personnel management statutory provisions.295  
H.R. 1836 was referred to the House Government Reform Committee so it could 
consider all provisions that fell within its jurisdiction and Chairman Davis set a 
hearing date of May 6. 296   
F. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON NSPS 
1. April 29, 2003 – House Government Reform Committee Civil 
Service and Agency Organization Subcommittee 
Also on April 29, 2003, the Civil Service and Agency Organization 
Subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee held hearings on 
NSPS.  The following individuals testified during the hearing:  Under Secretary 
Chu, OPM Deputy Director Dan G. Blair, and the AFGE National President 
Bobby L. Harnage, Sr.  Representative Jo Ann Davis (R-VA) chaired this 
Subcommittee and Representative Danny K. Davis (D-IL) was the ranking 
minority member. 
In her opening remarks to the committee, Chairman Jo Ann Davis 
stressed the importance of civil service reform, particularly for the DoD:  
We must find a way to recruit, reward, and retain our most talented 
employees and to get the most out of our Federal work force…the 
Defense Department…certainly has personnel needs that are 
different from the rest of the Federal Government.  297 
However, Representative Danny K. Davis expressed his concern over the 
timing and the manner in which it was created: 
This legislative proposal that we’re considering today and which is 
scheduled to be marked up on Thursday was delivered to Congress 
only two and half weeks ago.  In the human capital section of the 
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legislative proposal, it says that DoD’s proposal is based upon the 
Department’s civilian resources strategic plan…The GAO reviewed 
the plan…[and found] for the most part it lacked key elements 
found in fully developed plans.  This weak foundation is what the 
legislative proposal is based on.  Are we moving this legislation 
because it is good government, or because it is politically 
expedient?298 
OPM Deputy Director Dan Blair supported the administration’s position 
and Chu’s earlier statements during the hearing.  During Blair’s testimony, Jo 
Ann Davis raised the issue of waiting to see results from DHS’ use of personnel 
flexibilities before granting such flexibilities to DoD. In response, Blair noted that 
the agencies were different and, in contrast to DHS, DoD had “extensive 
experience in pay banding and pay-for-performance.”299   
While OPM publicly supported DoD’s effort to enact NSPS, things were 
less cordial behind the scenes.  Groeber recalled the tension between DoD and 
OPM during the process of enactment.  She specifically described phone calls 
she received from Jo Anne Davis’ staff members.  The staff members reportedly 
told Groeber individuals from OPM were telling them that DoD was “lying,” had 
not done its “homework,” and that NSPS would be “an abysmal failure.”300  They 
also indicated that OPM told them Davis should not support the NSPS 
legislation.301  Groeber lamented:  “It’s really hard when you think the 
                                            
298. House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency 
Organization, Transforming the Defense Department: Exploring the Merits of the Proposed 
National Security Personnel System, Serial No. 108-40, 108th Cong., 1st sess., April 29, 2003, 4. 
299. Ibid. 
300. Ginger Groeber (former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel 
Policy), in interview with Dr. Douglas A. Brook, Dr. Cynthia L. King, Maj Shane Prater, and CPT 
Eric Timmerman, Washington, D.C., August 20, 2007. 
301. Ginger Groeber (former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel 
Policy), in interview with Dr. Douglas A. Brook, Dr. Cynthia L. King, Maj Shane Prater, and CPT 
Eric Timmerman, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2007.  
 69
administration is going politically in one direction and you’re getting sideswiped 
by people who are supposed to be on your team.”302 
In an attempt to calm the fears of the committee members and other 
members of Congress, Groeber worked extensively with the OSD Congressional 
Liaison to create a series of informal memoranda entitled “Dear Colleagues.”303  
These memoranda, designed for NSPS supporters to send to their colleagues, 
provided answers to frequently asked questions and gave specific examples of 
past DoD civilian personnel management challenges that illustrated the urgent 
need for NSPS.  They were created in an effort to limit the anxiety of members of 
Congress and reduce the back-dooring from OPM. 
2. May 1, 2003 – House Armed Services Committee 
On May 1, the HASC held hearings on H.R. 1588, the NDAA for FY 2004, 
and debated issues that included NSPS.  The following individuals testified 
during the hearing:  Under Secretary Chu, Comptroller General David M. Walker, 
AFGE National President Bobby L. Harnage, Sr., and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Richard B. Myers. 
In his opening remarks to the committee, Chairman Hunter noted that “one 
of the most important and possibly controversial elements of this package is the 
creation of the National Security Personnel System.”304  The NDAA for FY 2004, 
the same as all NDAA bills, was a large document that contained all 
authorizations for the DoD for that fiscal year.  By singling out the NSPS 
provisions of the bill, Hunter revealed the importance of the NSPS proposal.  He 
welcomed debate over the legislation and expressed hope that the committee 
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could “arrive at a balanced package of management tools to help the Department 
better execute its paramount mission: to keep our nation secure in a very 
uncertain and turbulent time.”305  
Representative Skelton had a very different view regarding the DoD’s 
proposals and, more specifically, the limited amount of time allotted to debate 
them: 
I begin my remarks by using the phrase “shock and awe” on the 
issue that is before us…and I went from shock and awe to disbelief, 
and then I would say with sadness today that a good part of what is 
in front of us is cause for an abrogation of our congressional duty 
as spelled out in the Constitution.306 
This sentiment illustrated Skelton’s serious concerns about the proposed 
legislation and the timing of the bill. He reminded the committee “Congress 
received this 200-page bill two weeks ago, one day before we left town before 
the recess,” and that “there [are] some 50 provisions included in the bill, and its 
scope is absolutely enormous.”307  Nevertheless, even as Skelton expressed 
alarm over the speed with which the proposal had been introduced, others 
expressed their beliefs that the change was long overdue. 
General Myers, for example, believed that the NSPS provisions were “all 
very critical to the future of joint warfighting…and our national security.”308  He 
stressed his full support for NSPS, stating: 
 
The service chiefs and I have met on these issues many times and 
we strongly recommend that this committee incorporate the 
proposed legislation into the 2004 defense authorization bill.309 
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His statement was short and to the point; civil service reform was 
necessary and fully supported by the military leadership of the DoD.  In the view 
of Groeber, his statements and presence at the hearing “helped tip us over the 
good side,” and that “when the Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff says, ‘we 
need this,’ they [Congress] listen.”310  
Harnage, from AFGE, strongly opposed the NSPS legislation and argued 
that Congress was handing its authority over to DoD and the Secretary of 
Defense: 
This bill is asking—no, it is insisting—that you hand your authority 
on each of these matters to the Department on each successive 
Secretary of Defense.  They will make those decisions, not 
you…DoD’s proposal allows every new Secretary of Defense, 
without congressional input, to impose a new flavor-of-the-week 
pay-and-personnel system of its own design.  And employees and 
their representatives will have nothing whatsoever to say about it, 
and neither will you…their [DoD’s] case is a plea for freedom to 
waiver the laws and regulations that comprise the federal civil 
service. Our opposition is a plea for freedom as well.  We ask that 
you preserve our freedom from political influence, cronyism and the 
exercise of unchecked power. 311 
The debate over DoD’s proposed reforms continued until May 2.  
Supporters and opponents debated the content of the legislation in the limited 
amount of time available prior to markup. 
After just two days of committee debate on May 1 and 2, the HASC began 
its markup of H.R. 1588, which concluded on May 16.  The bill finally passed the 
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HASC and was sent to the full House for consideration. On May 22, 2003, the 
House passed H.R. 1588 by a vote of 361-68.312 
3. May 6, 2003 – House Government Reform Committee 
Meanwhile, on May 6, the House Government Reform Committee held 
hearings on H.R. 1836, the Civil Service and National Security Personnel 
Improvement Act.313  The following individuals testified during the hearing: 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Peter Pace, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Vern Clark, 
and OPM Director Kay Coles James. 
In his opening remarks, Chairman Tom Davis stated, “one of the most 
significant elements of this legislation is the National Security Personnel System 
proposal for the Department of Defense.”314  Referencing the debates the 
previous year regarding the Homeland Security Act of 2002, he reminded the 
committee that “the decades old system of hiring, firing, evaluating, promoting, 
paying and retiring was not appropriate for the new department of 170,000 
civilian personnel.”315  Chairman Davis continued by stating: 
The legislative proposal that was put forth by the Administration to 
establish a new civil service system for the DoD is mirrored closely 
on the language that Congress provided to the Department of 
Homeland Security in establishing its human resources 
management system. I believe it is ambitious; [however], it is a 
reasonable proposal for DoD, a Department that has decades 
worth of experience in personnel and work force policy, and has 
had a number of trial policies that they have put in place.316 
The foundation for the debate now laid, opponents of the legislation began 
their battle against the proposed changes. 
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Representative Waxman reiterated many of the same issues raised during 
the HASC hearing on May 1, including the limited amount of time allotted to 
debate the proposal.  He feared the proposal would “destroy 100 years of civil 
service laws with a sledge hammer,” and believed a bipartisan solution was 
possible if they were able to “slowdown this runaway legislative train.”317   
As it did in the May 1 and 2 hearings before the HASC, DoD sent top 
military officials to testify before the committee and explain why NSPS was 
necessary.  Admiral Clark stated that he “wanted to be on record that we can’t 
make it without them [civilians]…this bill will strengthen our human resource 
force, and I support wholly the principles that are embodied in this legislation.”318  
General Pace stated that he needed to replace the existing civilian Marines that 
were preparing for retirement, hire new people quickly to remain competitive with 
the private sector, and have the ability to pay people based on merit.319  These 
points were nearly identical to those made by Rumsfeld and Chu a month earlier.   
When given the chance to give her statement, James illustrated a point 
that had been lost in the interpretation of the NSPS legislation.  She believed that 
the essence of the legislation was to repair the outdated federal civil service 
system, not attack the civil servant.  James noted: 
We have, in working with the Department of Defense, been assured 
that those things that are very dear to American civil service are 
and will be protected as we look at how we change the systems.  
The American civil servants deserve better systems within which to 
operate.320 
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As had been the case in the HASC, the time allotted to debate these 
sweeping reforms was limited to just a few days of hearings. The committee 
finished marking up H.R. 1836 on May 7 and returned it to the HASC for full 
consideration.  
4. May 12, 2003 – Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 
Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee 
On the Senate side of the Capitol, the Oversight of Government 
Management Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee held 
civil service reform hearings on May 12, 2003.  The following individuals testified 
during the hearing: Under Secretary Chu, Comptroller General David M. Walker, 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Michael 
L. Dominguez, and Commander, Air Force Material Command, General Lester L. 
Lyles.   
During his testimony, Chu referred to NSPS as a “new vehicle of 
personnel management to take our defense civilian workforce into the next 
century.”321  Showering the DoD’s civilian workforce with praise, he commented 
on the “tremendous contributions” they had made to the DoD, but pointed out the 
“rigidities of the Title 5 system of personnel management make it difficult for our 
civilians to support our military.”322  Chu reminded the committee that numerous 
shortcomings had been identified not only by the DoD, but also by the Volcker II 
Commission, OPM, and in previous testimonies before the committee.323 
Comptroller General David Walker also testified before the subcommittee 
on May 12.  His views did not necessarily contradict the testimony of Chu, but he 
did make different suggestions as to the best way to fix the current system’s 
shortcomings.  Walker indicated his preference for implementing government-
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wide reforms, rather than just DoD-specific reforms.  He also stated reform 
should only take place when an agency had “an infrastructure in place to make 
effective use of the new authorities.”324  While Walker believed DoD had every 
intention of implementing such an infrastructure, he noted it was not in place for a 
“vast majority of DoD at the present time.”325  He continued: 
In the absence of the right institutional infrastructure, granting 
additional human capital authorities will provide little advantage and 
could actually end up doing damage if the new flexibilities are not 
implemented properly.326 
He also asserted that “adequate safeguards, reasonable transparency, 
and appropriate accountability” were all essential before the DoD moved forward 
in establishing a new civilian human resources management system.327  Walker 
explained that DoD should not be allowed to move forward without meeting these 
conditions or there might be unintended consequences. 
G. ADDITIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS THAT LED TO NSPS 
ENACTMENT 
1. S. 1050 – The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2004 
On May 13, 2003, Senator Warner introduced S. 1050, the Senate version 
of the NDAA for FY 2004.  Peter Levine, former Minority Counsel to the SASC, 
remembered that DoD’s legislative proposal “took a long time to get to 
Congress,” and it was “too close to our mark for us [SASC] to consider it in our 
bill.”328  Consequently, Warner’s bill did not contain any NSPS provisions.  
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Mainly due to the timing of the proposal, but also based on jurisdictional grounds, 
Warner elected to defer issues relating to NSPS to Senator Collins in the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee.329  This deferment led to the creation of S. 
1166, the National Security Personnel Act. 
2. S. 1166 – The National Security Personnel Act 
On June 2, Senator Collins, Chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee, introduced S. 1166, the National Security Personnel Act. This bill 
was in response to H.R. 1588 and had a number of co-sponsors, including 
Senator Levin, Senator George V. Voinovich (R-OH), Senator John E. Sununu 
(R-NH), Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), and Senator Akaka.330  The purpose of 
this bill was “to establish a Department of Defense national security personnel 
system,” but also to counter the aspects of H.R. 1588 that Collins did not agree 
with.331  Federal civil service fell under the jurisdiction of the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee, so Collins wanted to ensure all proposed 
legislation containing civil service reform provisions were referred to her 
committee for consideration.332   
The committee held a hearing on S. 1166 on June 4.  The following 
individuals testified during the hearing: Rumsfeld, David M. Walker, Bobby L. 
Harnage, Sr., and New York University Public Policy Professor, Paul C. Light.  In 
her opening remarks, Chairman Collins stated: 
The primary goal of the Federal personnel system should be the 
recruitment and retention of the highest quality workforce to serve 
the people of the United States. Unfortunately, the antiquated 
system now in place does not always achieve that goal. Although 
there are many superb Federal employees, bureaucratic barriers  
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make it hard to reward their efforts and it has become increasingly 
difficult for agencies to attract and retain employees with technical 
expertise or special skills.333 
Collins was a new chairman of the committee, and she tackled the DoD’s 
NSPS legislative proposal in a bipartisan manner.  She understood the rationale 
behind DoD’s proposal for change, but she believed it needed to “strike a 
balance between promoting a flexible system and protecting employee rights.”334  
S. 1166 was designed to strike this balance by granting “the administration’s 
request for a new pay system, on-the-spot hiring authority, and collective 
bargaining,” but denying the “authority to omit the Merit Systems Protection 
Board (MSPB) from the appeals process.”335   
In addition to denying the authority to omit the MSPB, S. 1166 also 
prevented the Secretary of Defense from waiving collective bargaining rights of 
employees.336  While Collins acknowledged that S. 1166 imposed some 
limitations on the DoD, she also asserted that the bill allowed DoD to achieve its 
goals.337 
Senator Levin co-sponsored S. 1166 and believed this bipartisan effort 
was different from the House version because it protected employees, which 
made the legislation more sustainable in the long run: 
Our bill will give the DoD the flexibility that it seeks to establish pay 
banding, rapid hire authority, a streamlined appeal process, and 
national level bargaining, but it would do so without giving up the 
employee protections that are needed to prevent abuse and are 
needed to make the civil service system work.  That is real reform.  
It is workable reform.338 
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The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee marked up S. 1166 on June 
17, and, on the same day, ordered the bill to be reported to the full Senate.339  
On September 5, 2003, S. 1166 was placed on the Senate calendar for full 
consideration.340  S. 1166 never passed the Senate, but according to Levine, “it 
became the basis for the Senate’s negotiating position in conference.”341 
H. MARKUP OF EACH SURVIVING CONGRESSIONAL BILL 
Reviewing public documents of hearings and proposals relating to NSPS 
revealed the outcomes of the process, but the interview data we collected 
exposed the contentious issues that were debated behind the scenes.  
1. H.R. 1836 – The Civil Service and National Security Personnel 
Improvement Act 
According to Mason Alinger, former Deputy Legislative Director, House 
Government Reform Committee, Hunter was a “strong supporter of defense 
issues, a strong supporter of Rumsfeld, and was willing to do whatever he 
needed to do, but [Hunter] looked to Davis to craft this package.”342 As 
mentioned before, Davis modeled H.R. 1836 after DoD’s The Defense 
Transformation for the 21st Century Act. 
Alinger recalled the markup as “a nine hour markup” that was “very 
contentious.”343  The contentious issues were raised by opponents who were 
sympathetic to union positions that mainly related to collective bargaining rights, 
but also related to pay-for-performance provisions included in the legislation.  
“We had met with AFGE before,” Alinger said, “but we [House Government 
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Reform Committee] were not able to accommodate their concerns.”344  During 
the markup, the committee “fought back some amendments … [and] accepted a 
couple … but by and large that was what defense [DoD] wanted.”345 
Abell remembered this markup vividly as the most stressful day in the 
process.  Recalling that the markup went until after midnight, he feared that 
NSPS was not going to make it into the final bill, which he felt “would have been 
crushing.”346  Abell went on to say that people were working on the bill, “but we 
just didn’t have enough Republicans…[and] most of the Democrats were going to 
vote party line.”347  He believed that if the House passed the bill, the Senate 
would follow along. Consequently, he tried to persuade as many members as he 
could to keep NSPS afloat. 
 Abell recalled members of the HASC sat in on the discussions of the 
House Government Reform Committee, but he remembered thinking, “when 
we’ve got members of Congress advocating for this, we’re [DoD] just in the 
way.”348 Abell said he felt that he needed to “support [it] from the cheap 
seats.”349  Alinger, for his part, also illustrated the importance of this markup 
when he stated: 
They [White House representatives] were actively involved.  This 
was a top priority for them at the time.  The White House legislative 
affairs guy was at the markup, which is significant for a House 
markup … that carries some weight when members see the White 
House point person…standing there and watching them. 
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After the markup, the HASC “took that language and without changing a 
single word, put it into the NDAA for FY 2004 [H.R. 1588]…which was a pretty 
heavy lift for Davis.”350  With the debate closed, H.R. 1836 had successfully 
been incorporated into the NDAA for FY 2004 and moved NSPS closer to 
enactment. 
2.  H.R. 1588 -- The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 
2004 
According to Alinger, the HASC used the House Government Reform 
Committee markup of H.R. 1836 to their advantage during the markup of H.R. 
1588, stating: 
This [H.R. 1836 markup] gave them [HASC] the leverage to say, 
“The Government Reform Committee has spoken on this.  They’re 
the experts on personnel policy.  We’d love to consider your 
amendment, but the time has already come to weigh in and debate 
the personnel system.  Let’s move on to some other issues in the 
bill, non-personnel related.”351 
Relying heavily on the work of Davis, Chairman Hunter had facilitated the 
protection of NSPS.  As mentioned earlier, the markup concluded on May 16.  
The bill finally passed the HASC and was sent to the full House for consideration. 
On May 22, 2003, the House passed H.R. 1588 by a vote of 361-68.352 
3. S. 1050 – The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2004 
Upon receipt of H.R. 1588, the House version of the NDAA for FY 2004, 
the Senate struck out all of the text of S. 1050, its version of the NDAA for FY 
2004, and amended it with content from H.R. 1588.353  On June 17, the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee reported S. 1166 for consideration.  Senator 
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Collins, a conferee on the conference committee for H.R. 1588, among others, 
expressed the hope that the provisions of S. 1166, as amended, would be 
seriously considered by the conferees as an alternative to the NSPS provisions 
included in H.R. 1588, which were placed in S. 1050.354  Although the exact text 
of S. 1166 did not replace the NSPS text from H.R. 1588 used in S. 1050, many 
of the provisions that were the same or similar to S. 1166 were added to the final 
version of H.R. 1588 during the conference committee.355  
I. FINAL CONFERENCE REPORT  
On July 16, the House agreed on a conference to resolve differences 
between the House and Senate versions of the defense authorization bills, H.R. 
1588 and S. 1050.356  The Senate and House both appointed conferees from 
the committees with jurisdiction over H.R. 1588.357  Jennifer Hemingway, former 
Professional Staff Member, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, explained 
how Representative Tom Davis ended up participating in the conference 
committee:   
When the SASC goes to conference…all of the Senators on the 
[SASC] are all appointed as conferees.  On the House side, 
because Armed Services is so large, they don’t have the entire 
committee sit and, because they have multiple referrals for 
jurisdiction, they appoint outside conferees.  Tom Davis was an 
outside conferee for the Title 5 changes.  That is my longwinded 
way of saying that he [Davis] was there to help back up Duncan 
Hunter.358 
Hemingway also noted that it was unusual to be discussing personnel 
matters in a conference where people would generally be more focused on 
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defense matters: “You’d see some of the members looking around [asking], ‘Why 
are we talking about labor relations?’”359  In her opinion, because neither a 
majority of conferees nor their staffers had a background in labor relations, “it 
really came down to what Collins, Levin, Hunter, Skelton, and Davis could agree 
to.”360   
Deliberations over the final version of H.R. 1588, the NDAA for FY 2004, 
took place over a number of months and encompassed a number of contentious 
meetings.  Abell recounted the insertion of the NSPS labor relations “sunset 
provision” as a turning point during one of these meetings.  According to him, 
even though he had not gotten prior authorization from Chu, he proposed the 
provision in order to move the negotiations forward:  
I leaned over to Ginger [Groeber] and said, “Ginger, I’m going to 
say something and I do not want you to react.”  So I said, “Clay, 
can I just throw something on the table here just for fun?,” and he 
said “sure, why not?”  I said, “what if we put a sunset [provision] on 
the labor relations piece so that the department [DoD] has to 
demonstrate that they are doing this in good faith and if they’re not  
successful then it reverts back?”  And you could see the 
Congressional guys lean back in their chairs and say, “oh yeah, we 
got ‘em.”361 
This provision, Abell asserted, was what saved the legislation, and ended 
the meeting.  
Although she was unsure of where the sunset provision originated, 
Hemingway thought this stipulation was what broke the logjam.  “I think when we 
thought we came up with the clever trigger for labor relations…that Congress 
would have to act affirmatively to let it continue,” stated Hemingway.362  As a 
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result, she believed that “the unions quietly realized … that gave them four or five 
years to fight it out, [with the] hope for a Democratic Congress and stop the 
trigger.”363 
Despite the inclusion of the labor relations sunset provision, all differences 
were still not completely resolved and Collins was hesitant to sign the conference 
report.  “Collins was the last person to sign the conference report,” remembered 
Hemingway.364  Levine believed Collins was under a tremendous amount of 
political pressure from fellow lawmakers and the White House to sign it:  
The majority of Senate conferees, it is safe to say, were opposed to 
the House provision, and in fact, were opposed to the provision we 
ended up with.  But, you don’t get a Conference Issue Report 
unless you have an agreement on every issue.  The House 
conferees and the White House made it clear we were not going to  
have a Conference Issue Report unless we take their position on 
this…so in the end, Senator Collins was invited over to the White 
House…she did the best she could.365 
After nearly four months of deliberation, the conference report, House 
Report 108-354, was reported for consideration, and then passed on November 
11.  The following day, the Senate also passed the conference report and 
forwarded H.R. 1588 and House Report 108-354 to President Bush.366  On 
November 24, 2003, President Bush signed H.R. 1588, the NDAA for FY 2004, 
into law.  It became Public Law 108-136, and enacted NSPS.367 
J. OPINIONS REGARDING NSPS ENACTMENT 
During interviews with various DoD representatives, they shared their 
views on why they believed the NSPS legislation was enacted.  Former Principal 
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Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Charlie Abell 
shared his view: 
One of the reasons it [NSPS] was doable was that David [Chu] and 
I were willing to work on it.  Other colleagues proposed 
transformational things and then sat back and waited for it to occur. 
Now, that’s my assessment [and] that might be unkind, but it is my 
assessment.  And then, when it didn’t happen, or they’d run into 
roadblocks in the Congressor the Administration, it was, ‘oh 
darn.’368  
 Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy, 
Ginger Groeber, believed that the support provided by senior DoD leadership 
was important, especially support provided by senior military leaders, like 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers.369 
DoD Senior Associate Deputy General Counsel for Labor Relations, Helen 
Sullivan, remembered that the “stars aligned” to get NSPS approved when 
President Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and a Republican-led Congress 
came into power at the same time.370  She also expressed her belief that the 
2002 battle to gain human resources management system flexibilities for the 
newly-formed DHS had served as a template for DoD.  Those who observed the 
process learned many things, but the key lesson was to not seek more 
widespread flexibilities than DHS gained.   
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V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
A. DISCUSSION 
This thesis began with two research questions: 
 
1. How was the NSPS legislative proposal created?  More specifically, 
how was Section 101 of “The Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act” 
created?   
2. How was NSPS enacted?  More specifically, how did Section 1101 
of the NDAA for FY 2004, which authorized the establishment of NSPS, become 
law?   
Having detailed the chronological, factual history of NSPS creation and 
enactment, we now turn our attention to examining how it was created and 
enacted through the lens of policy process frameworks.  In Chapter II, we briefly 
explained the main concepts of seven popular frameworks. These frameworks 
provided a survey of potential theoretical lenses that could link this particular 
case to existing public policy theory. Through our analysis of the NSPS case, we 
suggest that there are three primary frameworks that deepen our understanding 
of how this legislation was enacted. Specifically, in this chapter, we view this 
case through the Punctuated-Equilibrium framework, the Multiple-Streams 
framework, and the Institutional Rational Choice framework. 
1. Policy Equilibrium Punctuated 
The Punctuated-Equilibrium framework asserts that political processes are 
“often driven by a logic of stability and incrementalism, but occasionally they also 
produce large-scale departures from the past.”371  Stability typically 
characterizes most policy areas, but when a crisis occurs, it can alter the public 
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policy realm dramatically.372  From the enactment of the CSRA in 1978 until the 
enactment of the has of 2002, the U.S. Civil Service system experienced a period 
of relative stability.  While the CSRA contained provisions authorizing 
demonstration projects, the opportunity to substantially reform the system did not 
arise until the policy equilibrium was punctuated.  We argue this punctuation 
occurred in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when the country was 
united against a common enemy and national security became a valid 
justification for initiating dramatic change.  This crisis disrupted the policy 
equilibrium and provided an opportunity to enact meaningful change: following 
9/11, a new policy window opened.   
2. Policy Window Opened 
Policy windows open infrequently, and do not stay open long.  
Despite their rarity, the major changes in public policy result from 
the appearance of these opportunities.373 
- John W. Kingdon 
In Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Kingdon introduced the 
concept of the “policy window” unexpectedly opening, giving the “policy 
entrepreneur” the opportunity to “rush and to take advantage of it.”374  Kingdon 
argued that these windows of opportunity might open in three circumstances:   
during a change of administration, a turnover of the political actors, or a shift in 
the mood of the nation.375  Although George W. Bush had replaced Bill Clinton 
as President in January 2001, bringing about a turnover of political actors 
associated with a change of presidential administrations, past research and the 
current study suggest that the crisis of 9/11 was the primary catalyst that opened 
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the policy window.376  After 9/11, the security of the nation became front-page 
news on a daily basis, and “national security” was offered repeatedly as a 
rationale for personnel policy changes, both in DHS and in DoD.377   After the 
policy window opened, policy entrepreneurs emerged and took the opportunity to 
pursue transformational initiatives, drawing on national security as a potent and 
effective justification.   
The first instance of the Bush Administration taking advantage of the open 
window to achieve civil service reform occurred with the proposed new 
Department of Homeland Security.  On November 25, 2002, President Bush 
signed into law the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created DHS and 
initiated the largest government reorganization since the DoD was created in 
1947.378  Our analysis suggests that the DHS legislation served as a precursor 
for additional civil service reform in DoD.  DoD’s push for NSPS also operated 
within the policy window created by 9/11, and the successful passage of DHS 
personnel legislation offered an additional support for DoD to draw on. 
As we indicated in our review of the history of federal personnel reform in 
Chapter II, the arguments that emerged in the NSPS debates were not new. 
However, when issues emerge within a policy window created by a crisis—or, in 
Baumgartner and Jones’ terms, a “punctuation” in the policy equilibrium—they 
take on new traction in the policy environment. Kingdon’s theory of policy and 
political streams offers additional theoretical insights into what occurred in the 
NSPS case.   
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3. Policy Streams and Political Streams Coupled by Policy 
Entrepreneurs 
a. Policy Stream Was Civil Service Reform 
Kingdon noted that instead of a more rational, linear model of 
decision making, the policy-making environment is more like a “garbage can,” 
into which a mix of problems and solutions are poured.379  Within that garbage 
can, there are both policy streams and political streams, and different issues may 
emerge as relevant depending on what else is happening in the environment.380  
In the policy stream, he asserts, “proposals, alternatives, and solutions float 
about, being discussed, revised, and discussed again.”381 For example, things 
such as tax reform proposals, environmental protection regulations, and 
education reform proposals all exist and are arguably important, but each may 
garner different levels of attention and support over time.  Kingdon described 
these proposals, alternatives, and solutions as being “constantly in the policy 
stream, but then suddenly become elevated on the governmental agenda 
because they can be seen as solutions to a pressing problem or because the 
politicians find their sponsorship expedient.”382  In the case of civil service 
reform, there are many proposals that reside in the policy stream, but most of 
them would not normally garner a great deal of attention.  However, within the 
window opened by 9/11, NSPS was elevated above other issues as particularly 
important and relevant given the current policy environment, or “political stream.” 
Both the policy and political streams contributed to the elevation of NSPS as a 
key policy concern.    
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b. Political Stream Was National Security 
Kingdon described the political stream as one that is “composed of 
such things as public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan 
or ideological distributions in Congress, and changes in administration.”383  In 
the simplest terms, the political stream is the political environment at the time—
including factors such as which party controls Congress and the White House, 
what issues are important, and the mood of the country.  As we have described, 
after 9/11, the nation was united against a common enemy and very supportive 
of DoD and its efforts to ensure national security.  Additionally, there was a 
Republican president, Republicans held the majority in both houses of Congress, 
and key leaders in Congress were very sympathetic to Rumsfeld’s transformation 
agenda.   
c. Policy Entrepreneurs Were Chu and Abell 
One thing that happens when policy windows open is that policy 
entrepreneurs emerge.  Policy entrepreneurs are characterized by their 
“willingness to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes 
money—in the hope of future return.”384   
The two important policy entrepreneurs in this case were Chu and 
Abell.  Both had advocated for civil service reform well before the creation of the 
NSPS legislative proposal.  For example, in 2001, Chu co-authored a chapter in 
a book, Keeping the Edge:  Managing Defense for the Future, which argued in 
support of many of the provisions that were eventually included in the NSPS 
legislative proposal.385  As previously noted, Abell served as a Professional Staff 
Member for the SASC during the Clinton Administration and attempted to gain 
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civil service reform within the DoD while in that position.386 Additionally, 
Rumsfeld’s transformation initiative coincided with the completion of the 
USD(P&R)’s Best Practices Initiative and Task Force, and Chu saw it as an 
opportunity to “consider extending these [Best Practices] authorities to the entire 
department.”387  Chu’s staff then created a formal NSPS legislative proposal and 
began lobbying Representatives Hunter and Davis, both of whom could assist 
him in enacting NSPS.   
Chu and Abell capitalized on the political and policy streams to get 
NSPS enacted, and they drew on national security as a justification for bringing 
about civil service reform in the DoD.  Both individuals were energized by the 
opportunity presented by the opening of the policy window, and they were able to 
take full advantage of the punctuated equilibrium.    
When a policy window opens and an issue increases in importance 
within the policy and political streams, the issue also moves from the 
micropolitical to the macropolitical environment.  
4. DoD Civil Service Reform Moved to the Macropolitical 
Environment 
When a policy shifts to the macropolitical institutions for serial 
processing, it generally does so in an environment of changing 
issue definitions and heightened attentiveness by the media and 
broader publics.  It is then that major changes tend to occur.388 
- True, Jones, and Baumgartner 
In Theories of the Policy Process, True, Jones, Baumgartner assert that 
punctuation occurs when issues move from the micropolitical environment to the 
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macropolitical environment.389  When this shift occurs, the issue garners more 
exposure to a wider array of observers.  This exposure helps ensure the issue is 
addressed and ultimately resolved. 
Prior to the introduction of the NSPS legislative proposal, the issue of civil 
service reform within the DoD had almost always been a micropolitical issue.  As 
such, its level of importance was limited to simply managing civilian employees in 
the most effective and efficient manner.  Its level of exposure was limited to 
members within DoD, OPM, and AFGE, and the staffs of Congressional 
committees concerned with the issue of civil service reform, specifically the 
House Government Reform Committee and the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee.  These organizations and agencies can be viewed as a policy sub-
system.390  OPM and the Congressional committees represent the normal 
micropolitical environment in which civil service policy normally resides.  Once 
the NSPS legislative proposal was introduced, the issue of civil service reform 
within the DoD shifted to a more macropolitical issue.  Its level of exposure and 
importance increased, and it suddenly became a matter of national security.  
Without the enactment of NSPS, supporters argued, DoD would not be able to 
effectively fight the global war on terrorism and ensure U.S. national security.  
With its heightened level of importance, and new sense of urgency, the issue 
gained new, more widespread, exposure.  In addition to those who were 
previously involved, new actors became engaged.  They included White House 
and OMB officials and Congressional committees with oversight over DoD, 
namely the HASC and SASC.    
5. DoD Civil Service Reform Moved to a New Policy Venue 
Historically, civil service reform efforts have occurred within a stable policy 
sub-system.  They have been initiated within and led by OPM, and they have 
been pursued through the two Congressional committees tasked with oversight 
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over the U.S. Civil Service system: the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 
and the House Government Reform Committee.  Because making sweeping 
changes to the system has historically proven quite difficult, these efforts have 
been rare.  When they have occurred, most have failed.   
In the case of NSPS enactment, the issue moved from a stable policy sub-
system to a larger system involving new actors, such as the White House and 
OMB and the HASC and SASC.  Using national security as the key justification, 
NSPS supporters included authorization for NSPS in the NDAA for FY 2004.  Our 
analysis suggests that NSPS would never have been enacted if it had been 
introduced as a stand-alone bill, as was the case with the CSRA in 1978.  NSPS, 
as a stand-alone bill, would likely have been bogged down and defeated if it had 
not been accompanied by a larger, more pressing issue that garnered 
widespread support.  Additionally, had it been introduced by OPM, whose 
primary jurisdiction is personnel matters, OPM likely would not have had the 
political clout or support to get it passed.  To pass, NSPS needed the new policy 
environment created after 9/11, which thrust personnel matters to a new level of 
urgency.  In the words of Abell, DoD made the point that “this is national security” 
and it wrapped the U.S. flag around itself and said “we’re national 
security…we’re different.”391  This approach eventually resulted in the final 
version of the NSPS legislative proposal being debated and finalized in the 
SASC and HASC conference committee. 
6. Policy Window Closed 
Kingdon suggested there are three distinct reasons why the policy window 
of opportunity closes:  participants feel they have addressed the problem through 
decision or enactment, participants fail to get action, or the events that prompted 
the window to open pass from the scene.392 
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Although it extends beyond the scope of this thesis, we suggest the policy 
window closed because the legislation was enacted.  After the enactment of the 
legislation that authorized the creation of DHS and NSPS, politicians believed 
they had remedied the existing problems through the enactment of both the HSA 
of 2002 and Section 1101 of the NDAA for FY 2004.   
A final piece of our analysis addresses the controversial relationship 
between OPM, DoD, and AFGE throughout the NSPS legislative battle.  
7. Clash of Institutions 
As Sabatier noted, the Institutional Rational Choice policy process 
framework suggests that “institutional rules alter the behavior of intendedly 
rational individuals motivated by material self-interest.”393  In other words, 
individuals act in a manner that is consistent with the role, interests, and goals of 
the institution to which they belong. 
In the creation and enactment of NSPS, the roles of the primary 
institutions involved in the process were critical.  Each of these institutions 
shaped the debate and the process through which enactment occurred.  Each 
presented its position and fought vigorously for what it believed.   
After reviewing and analyzing all publicly available documents and 
transcripts from the interviews we conducted with key personnel from each 
institution, we developed a clear understanding of the role each institution 
envisioned for itself.  DoD saw itself as the protector of U.S. national security, 
OPM saw itself as the protector of the U.S. Civil Service system, and AFGE saw 
itself as the protector of the rights of union workers.  Additionally, we determined 
some of the key goals of each organization were as follows:  DoD wanted to 
transform itself by becoming more agile and flexible, OPM wanted to preserve 
the merit system principles, and AFGE wanted to prevent the creation of an 
unfair civilian human resources management system.  Thus, each of the three 
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institutions assumed a different role and had different core goals throughout the 
legislative battle. These differences led to a clash of institutions during the 
creation and enactment of NSPS.  
As policy entrepreneurs, Chu and Abell faced a number of challenges in 
their attempt to create and enact NSPS, the most notable of which was the 
opposition they faced from members of AFGE and OPM.  It should come as no 
surprise that one of DoD’s primary opponents in its attempt to enact NSPS was 
AFGE.  AFGE believed a large number of the NSPS provisions were anti-worker 
and anti-union, and therefore strongly opposed it.  Due to the political climate at 
the time, however, there was little AFGE could do to prevent enactment of NSPS.  
The White House supported it, Republicans held a majority in both houses of 
Congress, and the DoD experienced strong public and bipartisan Congressional 
support in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.   
The more surprising DoD opponent was OPM, who believed DoD went out 
of its way to work around it during the creation and enactment of NSPS.  This 
clash was quite unusual because DoD and OPM were supposed to be on “the 
same side” and working together to promote a common Bush Administration 
agenda.394  OPM disagreed with DoD on a number of specific issues, such as 
the preservation of veterans’ preference and the creation of a separate Senior 
Executive Service (SES) for the DoD, but there were two, higher-level points of 
contention between the two institutions.  First, OPM wanted to pursue 
government-wide civil service reform, instead of agency-specific reform.  In their 
view, if you changed the U.S. Civil Service system for each individual 
government agency, eventually you would no longer have a unified system.  
OPM also wanted to prevent one agency from gaining an advantage over 
another through agency-specific reform.  OPM’s goal, according to Blair, was to 
avoid giving “any agency an advantage over another in terms of recruitment and 
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Policy), in interview with Dr. Douglas A. Brook, Dr. Cynthia L. King, Maj Shane Prater, and CPT 
Eric Timmerman, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2007. 
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retention or other authority.”395  Second, OPM wanted to actively participate in 
the process of creating and implementing NSPS, instead of allowing DoD to do it 
on its own.  As James pointed out, OPM believed its primary mission was to be 
“the keeper of the U.S. Civil Service.”396  A key part of this mission, OPM 
believed, was ensuring the protection and enforcement of the merit system.  In 
the view of Blair, OPM was “charged with the enforcement of the merit system 
principals and it really took that role very seriously.”397   
B. CONCLUSION 
As has been established, DoD largely worked around OPM and AFGE, 
instead of working with them, in order to get NSPS enacted.  While it could be 
argued that this was a successful strategy in the short run, it may have some 
negative implications in the long run.  For the most part, DoD only made 
compromises on NSPS to get it enacted, not to appease OPM.  DoD made even 
less of an effort to work with AFGE, largely ignoring it during the NSPS creation 
and enactment phases.  While DoD certainly compromised on some issues 
surrounding NSPS, it achieved the majority of what it wanted; however, the same 
cannot be said for OPM and AFGE.  Still, OPM maintained a role in the reform 
process and AFGE ensured collective bargaining language was included in the 
final version of the NSPS legislation.   
The story of NSPS creation and enactment serves as a case study for 
other agencies seeking to enact reform.  One key lesson is that reform efforts are 
much more likely to be successful if the policy equilibrium is punctuated, which 
opens a policy window, allowing policy entrepreneurs to emerge and capitalize 
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on policy and political streams, which enables a reform agenda to move from the 
micro-political to the macro-political environment.  Another question that this 
thesis raises is about the utility of working around versus with your opponents. As 
this case illustrates, DoD made some collaborative efforts, but they largely 
proceeded through the legislative battle on their own. While this strategy had 
advantages for passing the legislation, it had implications for later 
implementation. One lesson from this case is that both advantages and 
disadvantages need to be considered in strategy formulation, and policy makers 
should consider the benefits of potentially winning the battle at the risk of losing 
the war. In the case of NSPS, DoD angered and alienated OPM, AFGE, and a 
number of Congressional Democrats.  These opponents could not stop the 
creation or enactment of NSPS, but some of the members of each institution 
bitterly fought NSPS implementation. Only the future can tell us what the long-
term implications may be and how successfully NSPS will be implemented 
across DoD.    
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As NSPS continues to be implemented within DoD, there are a number of 
topics that deserve further research.  
First, the process of NSPS implementation should be studied.  This would 
entail studying the period from NSPS enactment to present day and include an 
examination of the establishment of the Program Executive Office and 
Overarching Integrated Product Team.  It would also include the publication of 
proposed NSPS regulations, AFGE lawsuits, training efforts for DoD’s civilian 
supervisors, and the process through which civilian employees were converted to 
NSPS.   
Second, the cost and effectiveness of NSPS implementation should be 
studied.  According to documents provided by USD(P&R), NSPS was supposed 
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to be cost neutral or even result in modest savings.398  Annex D of USD(P&R)’s 
Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan indicated efforts would be made to 
evaluate NSPS.  More specifically, Objective 2.3 of the plan prescribed that the 
organization would determine and collect “baseline data” for NSPS evaluation 
and “develop evaluations plans for NSPS.”399 
Third, NSPS should be compared and contrasted to the proposed DHS 
civilian human resources management system, MAX HR.  There were parallels 
between the legislative proposals for each system and the justification used to 
lobby for them, but does this hold true for the resulting systems?  Future studies 
should examine how are they similar and different and which has been more 
successfully implemented and why.  
Finally, policy scholars should pay close attention to the successes and 
challenges facing personnel management reform in the long term. Specifically, 
given the relationship between different institutions who play a role in both 
enactment and implementation in personnel management reform, what impact 
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APPENDIX 1:  TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS 
Date  Event 
  
2 Mar 84 Section 6 of the Civil Service Miscellaneous Amendments Act of 
1983 authorized the China Lake Demonstration Project 
 
89 The National Commission on Public Service, chaired by Paul 
Volcker, issued its report, describing a “quiet crisis” in the federal 
civil service 
 
5 Nov 90 Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act (FEPCA) passed 
 
5 Oct 94 Section 342 (as amended by NDAA for FY 2000, Section 1109 and 
NDAA for FY 2001, Section 1114) of the NDAA for FY 1995 (PL 
103-337) signed into law; authorized the Secretary of Defense to 
conduct personnel demonstration projects at DoD laboratories 
designated as Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratories 
(STRLs) 
 
10 Feb 96 Section 4308 (as amended by NDAA for FY 1998, Section 845 and 
NDAA for FY 2003, Section 813) of the NDAA for FY 1996 (PL 104-
106) authorized the Acquisition Workforce Demonstration Project 
(AcqDemo) 
 
Aug 98 OPM published “HRM Policies and Practices in Title 5-Exempt 
Organizations,” which provided an overview of the constraints and 
inflexibilities of the merit processes embedded in the current Title 5 
civilian personnel system 
 
Feb 00 Final report of The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human 
Resources Strategy released 
 
Sep 01 The President’s Management Agenda for FY 2002 released 
 
Jan 01 The GAO added strategic human capital management to the list of 
federal programs and operations identified as “high risk” 
 
15 Feb 01 Road Map for National Security:  Imperative for Change, the Phase 
III report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century 
(the “Hart-Rudman Commission”) published  
 
17 Feb 01 President Bush issued an executive order dissolving the National 
Partnership Council, a labor-management council which was 
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created by President Clinton in 1993—his order also revoked the 
requirement for government agencies to establish individual 
partnership councils and increase union involvement in agency 
decision-making 
 
29 Mar 01 Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and Admiral 
Harry D. Train (USN, Retired) represented the U.S. Commission on 
National Security/21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission) 
before a joint session of the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of 
Columbia and the House Subcommittee on Civil Service and 
Agency Organization—they stated “it is the Commission’s view that 
fixing personnel problems is a precondition for fixing virtually 
everything else that needs repair in the institutional edifice of U.S. 
national security policy”   
 
Aug 01 USD(P&R) directed the development of the DoD Civilian Human 
Resources Strategic Plan 
 
Sep 01 DoD Civilian Personnel Policy Council (CPPC) held a “Kick-Off 
Session” to develop a methodology for strategic planning that 
entailed review and analysis of the OPM Strategic Plan, the DoD 
Strategic Plan, and the QDR 
 
30 Sep 01 DoD Quadrennial Defense Review issued, calling for a 
“transformation of U.S. forces,” and “a strategic human resources 
plan for its military and civilian personnel” 
 
15 Oct 01 Bush Administration submitted to Congress the Managerial 
Flexibility Act of 2001—among other things, it proposed giving 
federal agencies and managers increased discretion and flexibility 
in attracting, managing, and retaining a high quality workforce 
 
18 Mar 02 Kay Coles James, Director, OPM, testified before the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee Subcommittee on International 
Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services regarding Federal 
Employee Management Flexibilities 
 
Mar 02 USD(P&R) established the DoD Human Resources Best Practices 
Task Force to develop a single demonstration project construct for 
human resources flexibilities 
 
12 Apr 02 USD(P&R) published the first integrated DoD-wide Civilian Human 
Resources Strategic Plan 
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Apr 02 OPM published a white paper entitled A Fresh Start for Federal 
Pay: The Case for Modernization 
 
May 02 DoD Human Resources Best Practices Task Force provided an in-
process review briefing to USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L) 
  
Jul 02 DoD Human Resources Best Practices Task Force provided its 
final briefing to USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L) 
 
Fall 02 Details of the DoD “Best Practices Initiative,” were briefed to the 
staffs of the Civil Service subcommittees in the House and Senate 
 
Aug-Dec 02 A “steering group” of senior leaders reviewed, revised, and 
approved the Human Resources Best Practices Task Force system 
design in order to broadly apply the results to all current 
demonstration projects 
 
Nov 02 NDAA for FY 2003 Conference Report (House Conference Report 
107-772) directed the Secretary of Defense to review and report on 
the DoD Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan and 
demonstration projects to assess the effectiveness of 
demonstration authorities in reshaping the DoD civilian workforce 
 
25 Nov 02 President Bush signed H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, into law (P.L. 107-296) 
 
Dec 02 USD(P&R) and USD(AT&L) received final Human Resources Best 
Practices Task Force products that had been reviewed, revised, 
and approved 
 
Jan 03 OPM’s 2002 Summative Evaluation of DoD Science and 
Technology Reinvention Laboratories (STRL) Demonstration 
Projects report released 
 
18 Jan 03   Report of the National Commission on the Public Service (Volcker II 
Commission) entitled Urgent Business for America:  Revitalizing the 
Federal Government for the 21st Century, released 
 
Feb 03 AFGE National Office Staff briefed by DoD officials about the NSPS 
legislative proposal 
 




11 Mar 03 SASC Personnel Subcommittee held hearings on the Defense 
Authorization Request for FY 2004 
  
13 Mar 03 HASC Total Force Subcommittee held hearings to discuss total 
force transformation  
 
29 Mar 03 Charlie Abell, Deputy Under Secretary for Personnel and 
Readiness, spoke to members of AFGE in St. Louis, MO 
 
31 Mar 03 SASC Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee held 
hearings on military and civilian personnel programs included in S. 
1050, the NDAA for FY 2004 
 
1 Apr 03 Jacqueline Simon, Public Policy Director, AFGE, testified before the 
House Government Reform Committee Subcommittee on Civil 
Service and Agency Organization in opposition to replacing the 
General Schedule system with a pay-for-performance system 
 
2 Apr 03 Federal Register notice published proposing the revision (by 
amendment) of existing Science and Technology community 
personnel demonstration projects to comply with best practices as 
identified by the HR Best Practices Task Force and revised and 
approved by senior leadership 
 
4 Apr 03 HASC Chairman Duncan Hunter introduced H.R. 1588, the NDAA 
for FY 2004 
 
10 Apr 03 General Counsel of the DoD sent “The Defense Transformation for 
the 21st Century Act” to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and the President of the Senate 
 
28 Apr 03 Senator John Warner (R-VA) introduced S. 927, the Defense 
Transformation for the 21st Century Act of 2003 
 
29 Apr 03 House Government Reform Committee Chairman Tom Davis 
introduced H.R. 1836, the Civil Service and National Security 
Personnel Improvement Act  
 
29 Apr 03 House Government Reform Committee Subcommittee on Civil 
Service and Agency Organization held hearings on NSPS 
 
1-2 May 03 HASC held hearings on H.R. 1588, the NDAA for FY 2004 
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6 May 03 House Government Reform Committee held hearings on H.R. 
1836, the Civil Service and National Security Personnel 
Improvement Act 
 
7 May 03 House of Representatives completed markup of H.R. 1836 and 
forwarded it to the HASC 
 
12 May 03 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management held hearings regarding 
civil service reform 
 
13 May 03 Senator John Warner (R-VA) introduced S. 1050, the NDAA for FY 
2004  
 
16 May 03 HASC completed markup of H.R. 1588 and forwarded it to the full 
House for consideration 
 
19 May 03 House Government Reform Committee reported H.R. 1836 to the 
full House for consideration 
 
22 May 03 House of Representatives passed H.R. 1588, the NDAA for FY 
2004—Section 1112 authorized NSPS with some changes from the 
original DoD proposal 
 
Senate passed S. 1050, the NDAA for FY 2004—the bill did not 
contain authority for NSPS 
 
2 Jun 03 Senator Susan Collins, Chairman of the Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee introduced S. 1166, the National Security 
Personnel System Act 
 
4 Jun 03 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee conducted a hearing on S. 
1166  
 
17 Jun 03 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee passed S. 1166 by a vote 
of 10-1 
 
Jul 03   First Defense Human Resources Planning Board meeting held 
 
Acquisition Demonstration Project Program Office submitted a draft 
Interim Evaluation Report to OPM 
 
USD(P&R) completed The Department of Defense Assessment of 
Existing Civilian Personnel Demonstration Authorities as required 
by House Conference Report 107-772 
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16 Jul 03 House of Representatives agreed to conference with Senate over 
differences between H.R. 1588 and S. 1050 
 
Aug 03 John Gage replaced Bobby Harnage, Sr. as National President, 
AFGE 
 
18 Aug 03 USD(P&R) submitted The Department of Defense Assessment of 
the Existing Civilian Personnel Demonstration Authorities report to 
the SASC, HASC, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, and 
the House Committee on Government Reform as required by 
House Conference Report 107-772 
 
11 Nov 03 House of Representatives approved the conference agreement of 
H.R. 1588 
 
12 Nov 02 Senate approved the conference agreement of H.R. 1588 
 
24 Nov 03 President Bush signed H.R. 1588, the NDAA for FY 2004, into law 
(P.L. 108-136), enacting NSPS 
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APPENDIX 2:  LIST OF KEY PLAYERS 
Name      Role 
 
*Charlie Abell Former Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness and NSPS Overarching 
Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Co-
Chair 
 
*Dan G. Blair Former Deputy Director, OPM and 
Acting Director, OPM 
 
*Andrew Card Former White House Chief of Staff 
 
*David S.C. Chu Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness 
 
Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) Former Chairman, Senate 
Governmental Reform Committee; 
introduced S. 1166, the National 
Security Personnel System Act  
 
Rep. Tom Davis (R-VA) Former Chairman, House Government 
Reform Committee; introduced H.R. 
1836, the Civil Service and National 
Security Personnel Improvement Act  
 
*Brian DeWyngaert Chief of Staff, AFGE 
 
John Gage Current National President, AFGE 
 
*John Gartland Former Associate Director for 
Legislative Affairs, OPM 
 
*Ginger Groeber Former Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy 
 
Bobby L. Harnage, Sr. Former National President, AFGE 
 




Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) Former Chairman, HASC; introduced 
H.R. 1588, the NDAA for FY 2004 
 
Kay Coles James   Former Director, OPM 
 
Clay Johnson Deputy Director for Management, OMB 
 
Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) Former ranking minority member, SASC 
 
*Peter Levine Former Minority Counsel, SASC 
 
Paul C. Light Founding Director, Brookings Center for 
Public Service and Senior Adviser, 
National Commission on the Public 
Service 
 
General Richard B. Myers Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
 
*Mark Roth General Counsel, AFGE 
 
Donald Rumsfeld Former Secretary of Defense 
 
*Ronald P. Sanders Former Associate Director for Policy, 
OPM 
 
*Robert Shea Former Counselor to the Deputy 
Director for Management, OMB 
 
Jacqueline Simon Public Policy Director, AFGE  
 
*Helen Sullivan  Former Associate Deputy General 
Counsel, Department of Defense —
drafted NSPS portion of “The Defense 
Transformation for the 21st Century Act” 
 
David Walker Comptroller General of the U.S. 
 
Sen. John Warner (R-VA)  Former Chairman, SASC; introduced S. 
927, the Defense Transformation for the 
21st Century Act of 2003 
 
Paul Wolfowitz Former Deputy Secretary of Defense 
 
*Asterisks denote individuals interviewed by the authors and/or the thesis 
advisors 
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